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LEVERAGED LENDING AND THE SEARCH FOR COVENANTS
FREDERICK TUNG*
JULY 7, 2021
ABSTRACT
It was once conventional wisdom that lenders routinely influenced
co po a e manage deci ion making. Covenants constrained borrower risk
taking and compelled specific affirmative obligations to protect lenders.
Recent policy discussion, however, laments loan ma ke
n o various
forms of high-risk lending. So-called leveraged loans relatively risky,
below-investment-grade loans more than doubled in outstanding dollar
terms, growing from about $550 billion in 2010 to $1.2 trillion by 2019.
These risky loans have taken up a larger and larger share of the loan markets
over time. More leveraged loans are also co enan -li e, i ed i ho
traditional financial maintenance covenants. And regulators worry about
add-back
bo o e g o ing p ac ice of making p a d adj men o
projected earnings that tend to weaken leverage constraints.
Mo eo e , bank eg la o change ha e incen i i ed o igina e-todi ib e loan ndica ion that enable non-bank lenders to hold and trade
leveraged loans too risky for banks to keep. Syndicated lending now involves
g ea e and g ea e pa icipa ion b nonbank o in i ional lende like
hedge funds, CLOs (collateralized loan obligations), and mutual funds.
Commentators worry about the new species of risky loans, with their dearth
of traditional covenants and the fewer instances of lender intervention, which
may portend instability in debt markets. At the same time, weakened
covenant protections may lead to weakened corporate governance.
In this Article, I respond to these fears, arguing that they may be
overblown. The increasing share of leveraged and covenant-lite loans may
not necessarily evidence undisciplined debt issuance. Many seemingly
troublesome loans are issued as subparts of deals that include loans with
traditional covenants and cross-default provisions, which effectively
constrain borrower behavior. Though add-backs may increase firm leverage,
they may also improve the informativeness of earnings-based financial
covenants. In addition, while the incidence of loan covenant violations has
dropped dramatically across U.S. public firms, recent research suggests that
covenants have become more efficient. In effect, covenants are doing more
with less. Financial covenants have generally become less restrictive and
more discriminating in differentiating distress from non-distress situations.

*

Howard Zhang Faculty Research Scholar, Associate Dean for Equity, Justice and Engagement, and
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law (fredtung@bu.edu). Many thanks to Gary Lawson,
Naomi Mann, David Seipp, David Walker, and Kat Zeiler for helpful comments and conversation, as well as
workshop participants at the Boston University School of Law.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3882862

Forthcoming 47 JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW __ (2021).

DO LENDERS STILL MONITOR?
LEVERAGED LENDING AND THE SEARCH FOR COVENANTS
FREDERICK TUNG
JULY 7, 2021

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1
6

I.

TRADITIONAL BANK LENDING: COVENANTS AND MONITORING
A.
B.

THE STRUCTURE OF BANK LENDING ................................................................... 6
TRADITIONAL COVENANT STRUCTURE ............................................................... 8
1. Covenant Setting to Control Agency Costs............................................. 8
2. Covenant Violations ....................................................................................... 9
3. Lender Governance....................................................................................... 11

II. THE NEW LOAN MARKETS .................................................................... 14
A. TRADITIONAL SYNDICATED BANK LENDING ...................................................14
B. DEMAND FOR LEVERAGED LOANS .....................................................................17
1. Banking Dereg la ion and Financial Firm Consolidation ......... 17
2. Junk Bonds and Leveraged Buyouts ....................................................... 20
3. Modernizing Bank Capital ......................................................................... 21
4. Securitization: Collateralized Loan Obligations ............................... 23
C. THE SHAPE OF LEVERAGED LENDING ...............................................................23
D.
FEAR OF FLYING: REGULATORS’ VIEW .........................................................25
III. THE NEW LENDER GOVERNANCE ....................................................... 28
A. SPLIT CONTROL .....................................................................................................29
B. EARNINGS ADD-BACKS AND INFORMATIVENESS.............................................32
C. THE TURN TOWARD EFFICIENT COVENANTS ..................................................35
IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 39

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3882862

Forthcoming 47 JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW __ (2021).

DO LENDERS STILL MONITOR?:
LEVERAGED LENDING AND THE SEARCH FOR COVENANTS
FREDERICK TUNG
JULY 7, 2021
INTRODUCTION
Forty-odd years ago, financial economists began to teach us about the
important interactions between capital structure and corporate governance,
explaining h he
c e of fi m deb con ac ma e fo co po a e
governance.1 The finance literature continues to document the ways that
various features of lending contracts constrain manage beha io . Lenders
routinely influence corporate decision making, even outside the distress
context. The pervasiveness of lender influence in public companies suggests
that lender constraints loan covenants may often substitute for or
complement conventional corporate governance.2 Banks may be better realtime monitors of corporate decision making than corporate boards, which do
not enjoy the regular stream of information that banks receive. Banks enjoy
enormous advantages over other outsiders e en he bo o e fi m o ide
directors in e m of acce o he fi m manage and p i a e info ma ion. 3
The beneficent effects of bank monitoring on firm value have been well

1

E.g., Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Fnancial Contracting, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979).
Conventional internal and external corporate governance mechanisms independent boards and markets
for corporate control, for example may be less critical in the presence of bank lending, since bank
monitoring can substitute for these governance mechanisms. Steven S. Byers, L. Paige Fields & Donald R.
Fraser, Are Corporate Governance and Bank Monitoring Substitutes: Evidence from the Perceived Value of
Bank Loans, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 475, 476 (2008) (finding that loan announcements are more likely to generate
positive wealth effects for firms with weak internal and external corporate governance, which suggests that
bank monitoring may substitute for weak governance); Ioannis Spyridopoulos, Tough Love: The Effect of
Deb Con ac De ign on Fi m Pe fo mance, 9 REV. CORP. FIN. STUD. 44, 47 (2020) (finding that even
absent any covenant violation, stricter loan covenants improve performance of firms with managerial agency
conflicts those (a) without a large monitoring blockholder; (b) facing softer product market competition; or
(c) with entrenched management). See also Sungyoon Ahn & Wooseok Choi, The Role of Bank Monitoring
in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Borro e Ea ning Managemen Beha io , 33 J. BANK. & FIN.
425 (2009) (finding ha bo o e fi m ea ning managemen beha io dec ea e a he eng h of bank
monitoring increases).
3
Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Boardroom: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate
Governance, 57 UCLA LAW. REV. 115, 125 (2009).
2
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documented over the past few decades,4 and the finance literature continues
to expand the mapping of lender governance. 5
Various observers of the lending markets, however, including
regulators and rating agencies, foresee potential trouble ahead. Covenants are
disappearing; lender interventions are becoming more rare. 6 Without loan
covenants, there is no lender governance or monitoring. The leveraged loan
market triggers special concern. Leveraged loans are relatively risky, belowinvestment-grade loans.7 Over the last decade, this market has exploded,
more than doubling in size. From 2010 a low point for leveraged lending in
the aftermath of the financial crisis to mid-2019, leveraged lending grew
from about $550 billion to $1.2 trillion.8 In that same period, the share of socalled covenant-li e ( co -li e ) le e aged loan j mped f om nde 5% o
about 85%.9 Cov-li e loan a e o i ome beca e he con ain no financial
maintenance covenants. Traditional loan agreements include covenants,
which con ain a io a pec of he bo o e ope a ion o in e men
or financing decisions, in order to protect the lender from borrower risk
taking over the life of the loan. A financial maintenance covenant requires
the borrower to maintain a specified level of financial constraint, e.g., a
certain ratio of debt to cash flow or earnings relative to interest expense.10
4

Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 219 (1987)
(showing a positive and statistically significant stock price response to the public announcement of bank
loans, but a nonpositive response for publicly placed straight debt issues, and a negative and statistically
significant response for debt privately placed with insurance companies and private placements and straight
debt issues used to repay bank loans); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1100-01 (1995) (noting that the prospect of repeat business
with the borrower firm may serve to align he bank in e e
i h ho e of e i holde a o in e men
polic and he fi m eco e ); Sudip Datta, Mai Iskandar-Datta & Ajay Patel, Bank Monitoring and the
Pricing of Corporate Public Debt, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 435, 437 (1999) (finding that the presence of a preexisting
bank loan reduces at-i e ield p ead fo bo o e fi m fi p blic deb offe ing b an a e age of 68
basis points, and the length of the bank/firm relationship is negatively related to at-issue yield spreads,
consistent with the monitoring hypothesis); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the
Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006). Firm value may also be enhanced
h o gh he ce ifica ion effec of bank lending. A bank decision to extend financing may signal the
bo o e fi m c edi o hine , offe ing ef l info ma ion o ec i ie ma ke and he eb enhancing
he ma ke al e of he fi m e i .
5
E.g., Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Value, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1713 (2012) (finding that firm operating performance and stock price performance
improve post-covenant-violation); Daniel Ferreira, Miguel A. Ferreira & Beatriz Mariano, Creditor Control
Rights and Board Independence, 73 J. FIN. 2385 (2018) (finding that the number of independent directors
increases by about 24% following a covenant violation, that most new directors have ties to lenders, and that
firms that appoint new directors post-violation are more likely to issue new equity and to decrease payouts,
operational risk, and CEO cash compensation).
6
See infra Part II.D.
7
Though there is no formal agreed-upon definition of what counts as a leveraged loan, a syndicated loan
rated BB+ or lower, or an unrated loan with an interest spread larger than 150 basis points (bps), is one
common benchmark. Loan Pricing Corporation, PC definition. A BB+ rating is the highest grade of noninvestment-g ade (o
pec la i e g ade) loan. Speculative grade loans are more likely to default than
investment-grade loans. As of mid-2017, some 90% of loans issued in the U.S. are rated. S&P GLOBAL,
LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA (LCD): LEVERAGED LOAN P RIMER 8 (2020); available at
https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LCD%20Loan%20Primer.pdf. A basis point (bp) is 1/100 of a percentage
point. So 150 bps is 1.5%.
8
Michelle Sierra, Leveraged Loan Market Size Doubles in Ten Year, Private Credit Explodes, REUTERS
(Dec. 23, 2019); Joe Rennison & Colby Smith, Debt Machine: Are Risks Piling Up in Leveraged Loans?,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019).
9
See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
10
The ratio of earnings to interest expense is commonly referred to as the Interest Coverage Ratio.

2
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With no financial maintenance covenants, a cov-lite loan is riskier than
traditional loans.11 Co -lite takes away the canary in the coal mine for
lenders. 12 Borrower firms seem happy to take up these risky loans, since the
ca ci of co enan mean fe e con ain on fi m ope a ion and i k
taking. At the same time, lender-investors appreciate the high interest rates
and fees that come with risky loans. Moreover, as the costs of credit continue
to decline as leveraged loan credit supply expands, lenders may enjoy less
and less clout to demand covenant protection. The explosion of leveraged and
cov-lite loans over the last decade naturally leaves regulators with misgivings
about the quantum of risk taking in loan markets.13
In addition to the prospect of riskier loan markets, fewer and weaker
covenants and an observed decline in lender interventions may portend
weakened corporate governance. Financial economists have demonstrated
empirically that judiciously crafted covenants can improve firm value. 14
Through covenants and monitoring, lenders routinely exercise significant
influence over corporate decision making. Weaker covenant protections and
fewer lender interventions may therefore detract from effective corporate
governance.15 Covenants screen borrowers ex ante. They also act as tripwires
e po
o ca ch he a en ion of bo h he lende and he bo o e
management. A covenant violation triggers a re-e al a ion of he lende
constraints on management, and perhaps a renegotiation of loan terms, often
well before a borrower firm approaches distress.
In this Article, I offer an updated and somewhat optimistic
perspective on the leveraged loan market and lender governance. Despite
important changes in lending markets that could plausibly exacerbate
systemic risk and blunt the efficacy of lender governance, I show that lending
practices have evolved to address the new risky lending. The steep growth of
the leverage loan market may suggest that lenders have only weak leverage
to demand contractual protections. But it turns out that lender governance
persists, even as syndicated lending has become more complex.
One a ifac of oda
le e aged lending i the greater number and
more diverse types of lenders involved in a leveraged loan deal as compared
to traditional syndicated loans. Traditional syndications typically involved
only banks, which typically held their loans to maturity. Today, banks still
arrange syndicated loans, but they are as likely to sell the loans in secondary
loan markets to non-bank institutional investors. Larger and more disparate
lender groups make loan enego ia ion ( workouts ) more difficult.
Different types of institutions hold differing priorities. A non-bank lending

11

Cov-lite loans may, however, include so-called inc ence co enants, which require compliance with
caps or financial ratios only when the borrower pursues a specified significant action, like issuing new debt
or paying dividends or making an acquisition. See infra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
12
Rennison & Smith, supra note 8 (quoting Ruth Yang, managing director at S&P Global Market
Intelligence).
13
See infra Part II.D.
14
See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
15
Jeremy McClane, Corporate Non-Governance, 44 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2020).
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group may include collateralized loan obligations (CLOs),16 loan mutual
funds, insurance companies, foreign investors, and pension funds, among
others. The presence of heterogeneous lending institutions complicates the
renegotiation of a loan agreement.
Another practice worrisome to regulators in ol e bo o e
potentially excessive leverage. Especially in the context of acquisitions and
other extraordinary transactions, borrowers and lenders have taken to the
p ac ice of ea ning add-back . The parties craft bespoke accounting
provisions in their private loan contracts that allow for adjustments to
projected earnings, which affect earnings-based financial covenants. With the
j ifiable aim of p e en ing a fai pic e of he bo o e f
e ea ning ,
the post-transaction borrower will adjust (augment) its earnings by adding
back non-recurring items that affect cash flows or accruals for example,
one-time charges or expenses of the transaction. The fi m deb -to-earnings
ratio is a typical leverage measure. Upward adjustments to earnings reduce
he fi m epo ed le e age, hich ma c ea e an e ce i el o pic e.
To the extent the borrower overstates adjusted earnings through add-backs,
the leverage measure may become even less reliable.
Lenders have adapted to these concerns, however. Lenders have
evolved new covenant structures to address the new and more complicated
renegotiation frictions that arise with leveraged loans. Covenants have
become more useful in three ways. First, loan arrangers have created socalled split control rights. An examination of individual cov-lite leveraged
loans might suggest an absence of covenant constraints, but it turns out that
very few leveraged loan deals are issued without maintenance covenants.
Taking account of all the loan tranches in a given deal, the banks continue to
enjoy the benefit of maintenance covenant constraints on the borrower firm.
The typical leveraged loan deal includes a bank-sponsored loan, which
almost always contains traditional financial covenants.17 At the same time,
the bank group will arrange one or more additional loans for the borrower,
but these loans will be sold to non-bank institutional lenders.18 In many deals,
the bank-held loans and institutional loans will include identical covenants.
But only the banks, and not the institutional lenders, enjoy the right to
renegotiate covenants or waive violations. This split control effectively
leaves the banks in charge of renegotiations with the borrower, reducing
bargaining frictions. Traditional co enan in he bank loan con ain he
borrower firm, which is subject to the covenants in all its loans. The absence
of maintenance covenants in a particular loan, then, does not mean that the
borrower is free from covenant constraints. 19
16

A CLO is a securitization vehicle that buys slices of many syndicated loans, issuing securities to investors
that are backed by the cash flows from the loans purchased. William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Tale
of Two Markets: Regulation and Innovation in Post-Crisis Mortgage and Structured Finance Markets, 2020
U. ILL. L. REV. 47, 97-105 (explaining CLO structure and post-financial-crisis evolution of CLO indentures
and federal regulation). See also infra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
17
This bank loan will typically be a revolving loan. The bank group may also extend an amortizing term
loan. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
18
These loans sold to institutional lenders are typically non-amortizing term loans, which for reasons we
discuss below, are riskier than the loans retained by banks. See infra Part II.B.
19
See infra Part III.A.
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Second, with respect to add-backs, though upward earnings
adjustments carry some risk of understating borrower leverage, new research
suggests that permissive use of add-backs may improve the informativeness
of EBITDA-based contract terms like financial covenants.20 Tailored
accounting provisions for financial performance covenants in private loan
agreements predict future cash flows better than GAAP-based measures.21
Better earnings information may eliminate noisy features of accounting
earnings, such that add-backs may facilitate both tighter covenants and fewer
false positive covenant violations.22
Lenders have recrafted covenants in another way as well. Over the
course of the last two decades, covenants have become more efficient. This
efficiency is driven largely by a turn away from balance sheet covenants in
favor of cash flow covenants, which are much more discerning than balance
sheet covenants. Cash flow covenants trigger false positives far less often
than balance sheet covenants, with a negligible increase in false negatives. 23
Financial covenants overall have also become less restrictive, both in terms
of the number of covenants in a given loan and their tightness. Reported
violations are correspondingly fewer. This should not be read as cause for
concern, however. Rather than leaving borrower firms with no guardrails,
covenant structures have instead become better at discriminating distress
from non-distress situations.24 Efficient covenants minimize the sum of
expected costs of false positives and false negatives.
The advent of split control rights, the informativeness of add-backs for
predicting future cash flows to set financial covenants, and the evolution to
efficient covenants suggest that it may be time to rework our understandings
of the magnitude and direction of lender governance. Fewer and more lax
covenants may not necessarily portend greater risk in the leveraged lending
market. Lower levels of lender intervention do not necessarily herald weaker
lender oversight.
My analysis proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain the traditional
structure of bank lending and the role of covenants and monitoring for lender
governance. I de c ibe bank traditional and particular expertise in crafting
covenants, monitoring borrowers, and renegotiating loan terms when the
borrower falters. Traditional covenant structure meant tight covenants and
pervasive monitoring, which differs dramatically from the evolved lender
governance of split control rights and more efficient covenants. In Part II, I
describe the evolution from traditional lending to a new and riskier loan
market, driven in part by banking deregulation, in part by the advent of junk
bonds and the 1980s leveraged buyout boom, in part by modernized bank
capital rules, and in part by the advent of securitization. I also summarize the
20

See infra Part III.B. EBITDA is one common earnings measure. It stands for Earnings Before Interest,
Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization.
21
See id. GAAP stands for Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
22
For our purposes, a false positive occurs when a borrower violates a covenant even though only a low
likelihood of distress exists See id.
23
A false negative occurs when the borrower has a high likelihood of distress, but no covenant is triggered.
See infra Part III.C.
24
See id.
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misgivings of regulators and other debt market observers concerned with the
ne loan ma ke appe i e fo i k. In Part III, I explain the new lender
governance regime. It features a number of lending contract innovations
split control rights, add-back informativeness, and efficient covenants.25
These innovations facilitate lender governance and debt renegotiation in the
face of larger loan syndicates with more dispersed lenders than in the past. I
also discuss implications of the new lender governance. Part IV concludes.
I.

TRADITIONAL BANK LENDING: COVENANTS AND MONITORING

This Part describes the structural features of bank lending that facilitate
traditional bank monitoring. It introduces the tools banks use to constrain
borrower risk taking and to facilitate monitoring primarily an array of
covenants that include affirmative and negative constraints and reporting and
financial covenants. It then explains traditional covenant structure, both the
e ing of co enan and he bank managemen of co enan iola ion .
A. The Structure of Bank Lending
Unlike equity holders, lenders do not enjoy unlimited upside with their
debt investments in firms. Instead, lenders must content themselves with the
regular periodic interest payments that their loan contracts memorialize, and
also the repayment of principal when the loan matures. Because lenders enjoy
no great upside from their lending, their natural obsession is to curb as much
downside risk as possible, without drastically in e fe ing i h he bo o e
ability to earn a respectable profit. By contrast, public company equity
holde , ho a e picall di e ified, a e be e off hen hei fi m
managers pursue all available positive net present value projects. Because
high returns to the firm arise only from firm managers taking high risks,
equity holders sometimes push for risky gambits.
This divergence of interests between lenders and equity holders gets
worked out in loan agreements. Lenders use covenants to constrain borrower
risk taking, and borrowers and lenders will trade off interest rate against
covenant strictness to reach a deal. A safer deal for the lender means a lower
interest rate for the borrower. Typical affirmative covenants include
obligations to purchase insurance and to comply with all applicable laws and
regulations. Typical negative covenants include constraints on additional
firm borrowing, payment of dividends or distributions to equity holders, and
major asset sales. Financial covenants are also typical. For example, the
lender may set a cap on the ratio of the bor o e deb -to-cash flow, in an
effort to assure that the borrower will be able to maintain its periodic interest
payments.26

25

See infra Parts III.A and III.C, respectively.
In addition to debt-to-cash flow, other common financial covenants include a fixed charge coverage ratio
(a mea e of he bo o e abili o co e all i fi ed cha ge ); a current ratio (the ratio of current assets
to current liabilities); and a net worth covenant.
26

6
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Bank enjo acce
o p i a e info ma ion abo
hei bo o e
business activities. Bank loan agreements typically demand regular reporting
by the borrower, including financial statements and certificates attesting to
he bo o e continuing compliance with financial covenants and other
contractual obligations. Bank lenders also often require their borrower firms
to keep their deposit accounts with the lending bank. This arrangement
enable he lende o clo el follo i bo o e agg ega ion and e of
ca h in eal ime, gi ing he lende a clea indo on he bo o e b ine
activity.27 These institutional features of bank lending make banks especially
effective monitors. Moreover, there is evidence that bank monitoring benefits
not only the bank and other creditors; it may also improve firm value to the
benefit of equity holders. Event studies consistently associate the public
announcement of bank loans with positive abnormal stock returns for the
borrower firm.28 The announcement is typically good news for shareholders,
since the loan commits the bank to monitoring the borrower firm over the life
of the loan.29

27

Fisher Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 326 (1975) (explaining
the informational advantages for a lender from maintaining i bo o e depo i acco n ); A no d W. A.
Boot, Relationship Banking: What Do We Know, 9 J. FIN. INTERMED. 7, 11 (2000); Eugene F. Fama, What s
Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 29, 37-38 (1985). Bank lenders also typically enjoy wide
acce o hei bo o e book and eco d . A bank ma al o ha e a ep e en a i e on i bo o e boa d
of directors, which enables the bank to obtain soft information about the borrower. Tung, supra note 3, at
138-40.
28
See Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 219 (1987);
Myron B. Slovin, Shane A. Johnson, & John L. Glascock, Firm Size and the Information Content of Bank
Loan Announcements, 16 J. BANKING & FIN. 1057, 1058 (1992); Ronald Best & Hang Zhang, Alternative
Information Sources and the Information Content of Bank Loans, 48 J. Fin. 1507, 1511 (1993); Matthew T.
Billett, Mark J. Flannery, & Jon A. Garfinkel, The Effec of Lende Iden i on a Bo o ing Fi m E i
Return, 50 J. FIN. 699, 700 (1995). A related literature suggests that nonbank private debt may also bring
bank-like benefits to equity holders. These studies show a positive stock price reaction to announcements of
nonbank private debt placements, with no statistical difference between announcements of bank debt versus
nonbank private debt. See Dianna C. Preece & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring by Financial
Intermediaries: Banks Versus Nonbanks, 8 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 193, 199 (1994); Billet, et al., supra.
29
See Sudha Krishnaswami, Paul A. Spindt & Venkat Subramaniam, Information Asymmetry, Monitoring,
and the Placement Structure of Corporate Debt, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 407, 409 (1999) (finding that firms with
greater growth prospects and therefore greater debt-related moral hazard problems rely more heavily on
private debt than public debt, and attributing this result to the monitoring advantages of private debt); Scott
L. Lummer & John J. McConnell, Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process and the Capital-Market
Response to Bank Loan Agreements, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 99, 101 (1989) (finding excess stock returns almost
exclusively around the announcement of loan renewals, but not new loans, and concluding that the value to
shareholders comes not from the initial screening of prospective borrowers, but from private information the
bank gleans during the course of its relationship with the borrower, consistent with a monitoring theory).
Thi po i i e ock ma ke eac ion ma al o a i e f om a complemen a
o ce. The bank deci ion to
extend credit may signal that it has positive private information about the firm i.e., the bank resolves
adverse selection problems for the stock market. See Best & Zhang, supra note 28; Charles J. Hadlock &
Christopher M. James, Do Banks Provide Financial Slack?, 57 J. FIN. 1383 (2002); Wayne H. Mikkelson &
M. Megan Partch, Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 31
(1986); Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms
Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984). The crossmonitoring benefits
may run in favor of the bank as well. One study finds that bank debt is cheaper for firms with publicly traded
shares or investment-grade public debt outstanding. James R. Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the
Cross-Monitoring Hypothesis, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 25 (1992).
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B. Traditional Covenant Structure
Covenant constraints in the initial loan agreement both screen
borrowers ex ante and c b manage di c e ion f om he incep ion of he
lending relationship. Subsequent covenant violations trigger lender scrutiny
and the possibility of further constraints on management and operations.
1.

Covenant Setting to Control Agency Costs

Empirical studies show that the structuring of initial covenants
responds to firm characteristics that affect credit risk, and that managers alter
their behavior in response to covenant constraints. Lender influence
commences from the very beginning of the lending arrangement.
Among other fears, lenders would worry that once credit is extended,
firm managers may favor their own interests or the interests of equity holders
over those of creditors. Managers might, for instance, substitute risky projects
for more conservative ones, since in the presence of debt, diversified equity
holders do better with the former than the latter. Managers might even spend
free cash on negative net present value projects, either to build empires for
hei o n benefi o o imp o e e i holde
p ide e n . The finance
literature has identified situations in which these agency costs may be most
troublesome. Financial distress, for example, heightens the conflict between
debt and equity.
Traditional covenant structure responds to those perils. Firms with
greater risk of financial distress smaller, more highly levered, more volatile
firms, and firms with highly liquid assets are more likely to have covenants
in their lending agreements. By contrast, loans to firms with a higher ratio of
tangible assets to total assets are less likely to include covenants.30 This
makes sense as tangible assets are easier to value and easier to liquidate than
in angible a e in he e en of he fi m defa l . Fi m
i h in angible
assets and growth opportunities are riskier because realization of the value of
these opportunities depends on discretionary future investment by the firm.
Specific covenants address this sort of risk: high growth firms are more likely
to attract demands for security, financial ratio covenants, and covenants
restricting dividends.31 Moreover, historically, private lenders set covenants
fairly tightly relative to the variability of the underlying accounting measure,
adj ing co enan lack o acco n fo hi a iabili fo each bo o e .32
Tighter covenants were also associated with lower borrowing costs,
consistent with the proposition that lenders valued these stricter limits and
their effects on borrower behavior. 33
30

Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants, 5 Q.J.
Fin. 1 (2015) (analyzing commercial loans made from 1993 2001, a eflec ed in Loan P icing Co po a ion
Dealscan database).
31
Id. at 19, tbl. 6 (relying on the market-to-book ratio as a measure of growth).
32
Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis, 40 J.
ACCT. RES. 1091, 1093 & 1106 07 (2002).
33
Cem Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, The Information Content of Bank Loan Covenants, 23 REV. FIN.
STUD. 3700 (2010). Tighter covenan ma al o impl eflec he lende
highe confidence in he
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Co enan al o likel affec manage beha io . De pi e he fac ha
technical covenant violations are common and do not typically result in
punitive lender action, managers cannot count on this. A violation triggers
he lende legal igh o demand immedia e epa men of he en i e deb ,
and even though acceleration is unlikely, a violation might always cause
ome c ailmen of manage ial di c e ion h o gh he bank in e en ion.
Even for healthy firms in the best of situations, there is a hassle factor: a
violation requires managers to explain. It triggers review by the bank and may
impose additional reporting burdens on borrower management, which is put
to the task of defending its forecasts and strategies.34 All this takes time away
from running the company. Banks also often charge a fee for a waiver or
modification of the loan. Managers have incentive to comply.
Though measuring the effects of loan covenants on managerial
behavior may be a bit tricky, studies tend to confirm that covenants have real
effec . When e look a fi m pe fo mance follo ing he loan incep ion,
we find some telling patterns. Comparing quarter-end accounting measures
with the associated covenants, one study finds an unusually small number of
loan quarters with borrower performance slightly beyond covenant
thresholds that is, in violation while an unusually large number cluster
just shy of the violation point. 35 In other words, there is a significant
discontinuity in the di ib ion of fi m pe fo mance on acco n ing
measures constrained by covenants. Moreover, the discontinuous pattern
becomes more pronounced over the life of the loan. This longitudinal
dimension is important. Clustering in general, while consistent with the view
that covenants constrain managers, does not necessarily rule out the
anticipatory contracting explanation that covenants are set in order to
an icipa e he bo o e f
e pe fo mance, b no o con ain i . When
lenders set tight covenants, we would expect to see some clustering near the
covenant threshold. Anticipatory contracting could plausibly account for
clustering generally or discontinuity in the quarters immediately following
he loan incep ion. Ho e e , he pe i ence and inc eased prominence of
hi di con in o pa e n in a loan la e ea i diffic l o e plain a an
artifact of anticipatory contracting. 36 Instead, the pattern suggests that
covenants have real bite: firms attempt to manage in response to covenant
constraints.
2.

Covenant Violations

Not surprisingly, poor performance and covenant violations typically
cause lenders to monitor their borrowers more closely and perhaps to actively
intervene in managerial decisionmaking. Financial covenant violations are

bo o e f
e pe fo mance. See id. Stock price reactions to public announcement of loans are also larger
for loans with tighter covenants. Id.
34
Dichev & Skinner, supra note 32, at 1096 (describing the hassle factor).
35
Id. at 1111 12 (investigating current ratio and net worth covenants).
36
Id.
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common, and they do not typically presage financial distress,37 though they
might trigger some lender response. Over a ten-year period, according to one
study, a quarter to almost a third of all public companies violated a financial
covenant,38 and this may be a lower bound, as methodological constraints
suggest that many technical violations may go undetected. 39 Violations rarely
lead to payment default or acceleration of the loan. A violation will trigger
he lende
c in , and fi m manage might be a ked o j if he fi m
strategies and forecasts. Ultimately, however, the lender most often waives
the violation.40
The second most likely lender response is to impose additional
constraints on the borrower.41 More serious measures such as a reduction in
credit, an increase in interest rate, or a requirement of additional collateral are
less likely,42 ho gh of co e, if he fi m slide were to continue, the bank
would resort to these and other more aggressive measures.43
Covenants are used primarily, then, not as a device to force the
bo o e
immedia e epa men of he loan, e en ho gh he lending
agreement provides for that remedy. Instead, covenants serve as trip wires
that signal the need for creditor attention. When the wire is tripped, the lender
steps in to update its information about the borrower. The lender
communicates with management and examines he fi m financial position
and internal forecasts. In most cases, tripping the wire does not ultimately
result in any punitive response by the creditor. But it does command the

37

Id. at 1093; Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts, How Does Financing Impact Investment?: The Role of
Debt Covenants 2 (draft Aug. 2007); available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=854324.
38
Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation, 64 J.
FIN. 1657, 1663-1664 & tbl. I (2009) (finding that for population of U.S. public companies between 1996
and 2005, more than one quarter violated a financial covenant, and for companies with an average leverage
ratio of at least 5 percent, the percentage increases to 30%). See also Dichev & Skinner, supra note 32, at
1093 (finding that with a Dealscan sample of private loans from 1986 99, violations occur in about 30
percent of all loans); Chava and Roberts, supra note 37, at 11 (finding that 37 percent of firms subject to a
current ratio covenant and 25 percent of firms subject to a net worth covenant during the period 1994 2005
committed a violation of the respective covenant).
39
One lending officer at a prominent insurance company reports that in a given year, the company will receive
on average one request for a covenant modification for each loan on its books. Edward D. Zinbarg, The
Private Placement Loan Agreement, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1975, at 35 (discussing private placement
lenders).
40
V. Gopalakrishnan & Mohinder Parkash, Borrower and Lender Perceptions of Accounting Information in
Corporate Lending Agreements, 9 ACCT. HORIZONS 13, 20 (1995) (surveying chief financial officers of
Fortune 500 companies, chief lending officers of the largest 100 banks, and the heads of private placement
departments at the top 100 insurance companies, with more than 95 percent of both borrowers and lenders
indica ing a medi m o high p obabili of a ai e ). Acco ding o one lende
epo , mo e han 95 pe cen
of e e fo co enan modifica ion a e g an ed i h no id p o o: he a majority of corporate
e e a e pe fec l ea onable and do no inc ea e [lende ] i k ma e iall . Zinba g, supra note 39.
41
Seventy-five percent of borrowers and 59 percent of lenders indicate a medium to high probability of
additional constraints. Gopalakrishnan & Parkash, supra note 40, at 20, 21 tbl.3.
42
Id.; Roberts & Sufi, supra note 38, at 1688, 1689 tbl. IX (noting from SEC filings for a random sample of
500 initial covenant-violating firms that 24% of violations resulted in reduced credit availability; 15%
resulted in increases in interest spread; 7% resulted in the lender requiring additional collateral; and that in
the aggregate, 32% of lenders took at least one of these actions, while 63% of violations resulted in a waiver
without additional action).
43
The most drastic remedies of termination of the agreement and acceleration of the debt are, of course, the
least common. Over 76 percent of Fortune 500 borrowers and more than 90 percent of their lenders assign a
zero or low probability to these outcomes. Gopalakrishnan & Parkash, supra note 40, at 20 21 tbl.3.
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lende a en ion and gives the lender the option to act, depending on what
its investigation shows.
3.

Lender Governance

Besides simply shoring p a bo o e c edi o hine
ih e a
collateral or reduced credit availability once a non-trivial violation occurs, a
lender may additionally force important changes in the way the firm operates.
The lender may demand crucial changes to financial policy or investment
policy. In a drastic situation, the lender may force the CEO replacement.
The lende infl ence on financial polic , of co e, begin a he
loan incep ion. Almost all loan agreement limi he bo o e abili o
incur additional debt.44 The restriction typically places a cap on a debt-related
ratio, using a debt measure as numerator and a measure of earnings, cash
flow, or capitalization as the denominator. 45 A covenant violation often
invites further constraints by the lender. In one study, normalizing firm
borrowing as a percentage of assets, a covenant violation results in a 0.7%
decrease in average firm borrowing in the quarter immediately following the
violation. This is an economically significant drop.46 It also endures.
Like financial policy, investment policy is a crucial aspect of manager
strategic decision making, effectively placing he fi m be on he f
e.
Banks typically enjoy meaningful influence over these decisions, since
covenant constraints allocate control rights over investment policy, making it
con ingen on he fi m pe fo mance. For example, one-third of public
company loan agreements contain a capital expenditure covenant, and over a
ten-year sample period, 42% of public firms face a capital expenditure
restriction at some point.47 Firms facing a new capital expenditure restriction
experience a decline in investment 15-20% larger than firms not facing a new
restriction.48 Not surprisingly, such restrictions are quite sensitive to firm
performance. A covenant violation, an increase in credit risk (as measured by
he bo o e deb -to-cash-flow ratio), or a ratings downgrade increases the
44

Roberts & Sufi, supra note 38, at 1663 (noting that almost 90% of loan agreements in their sample contain
an e plici o implici e ic ion on he bo o e
o al deb ).
45
Over 79 percent of loan agreements in the sample contain such a covenant. Id. at tbl. I. For example, one
agreement defines a leverage ratio:
Le e age Ra io mean, on any date, the ratio of (a) Total Indebtedness as of such date to
(b) Consolidated EBITDA for the period of four consecutive quarters of the Company ended on such
date.
Further down, the agreement caps the ratio at 3:1.
SECTION 6.12. Leverage Ratio. The Company will not permit the Leverage Ratio as of the last day of
any fiscal quarter to exceed 3.00 to 1.00.
Credit Agreement Dated as of November 14, 2006, Among Amerisourcebergen Corporation et al., §§ 6.11,
6.12 (on file i h a ho ). EBITDA i ea ning befo e in e e , a e , dep ecia ion, and amo i a ion.
46
Compare the effect of a change in firm size, which is the single most powerful predictor of net borrowing.
A two-standard-deviation reduction in the size of the firm results in only a 0.52% reduction in net borrowing
per quarter. In relative terms, the 0.7% drop moves the firm from the 65th to the 35th percentile of the withinfirm net debt issuance distribution. Id. at 1659.
47
Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy, 92 J. FIN.
ECON. 400, 405 (2009).
48
Id. at 413.
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likelihood that the borrower will face an investment restriction. For example,
a firm that suffers a ratings downgrade from he lo e S anda d & Poo
investment grade (BBB) to the highest speculative grade (BB) experiences a
21% increase in the likelihood of incurring a capital expenditure restriction.49
A similar increase in the likelihood of facing a capital expenditure restriction
befalls the borrower violating a covenant. 50 While violating firms also
commonly face interest rate increases, demands for collateral, and dividend
restrictions, the elasticity of the capital expenditure restriction with respect to
a violation is significantly larger than the elasticity of other loan terms. 51
Finally, it is important to highlight the uncommon but sometimes
nece a
ep of eplacing a bo o e fi m CEO. Tho gh canonical
accounts of change in the C-suite typically view boards of directors as the
central players, as a practical matter, lender influence may be at least as
important in many cases. The pattern is familiar. Having chosen a CEO who
subsequently oversaw excellent results over a number of years, a board may
be lo o ecogni e hen he CEO magic ha n o . Ha ing invested in
the effort to handpick a CEO, and then cheered her success for a time,
directors may naturally be reluctant later to second-guess their decision or
consider the possibility of a replacemen . Once i ha in alled o cho en o
e ain a CEO, he boa d i mo i a ed o
he CEO mo e han i ho ld. 52
Lenders, of course, are less likely to suffer from this commitment bias.53 They
were not formally (and likely not even informally) a part of the process that
chose this CEO. So he lende ma be able o a e he bo o e
i a ion
with more dispassion than the directors who backed the now-faltering CEO.
When the borrower gets into trouble, and shareholder pressure and the market
for corporate control are insufficient to effect a CEO change, lender influence
ma be ke . The fi m do n a d pi al ill likel
igge covenant
violations, which shifts control to lenders. And though lenders of course do
no fo mall decide he e i ing CEO fa e no ap he
cce o , lende
influence is felt. As earlier noted,54 once lenders enjoy the right to accelerate
the entire debt, a number of less drastic measures are also on the table. CEO
replacement is one.55
The familiar story of Krispy Kreme offers an illustration. Scott
Livengood served as K i p K eme CEO from 1998-2005. He had worked
for the company for several decades, having come up through the ranks of
the HR department. His devotion to and enthusiasm for the company were
legend. His wedding cake, for example, was made entirely from Krispy

49

Id. at 401.
Id. (noting that a capital expenditure restriction is 20% more likely with a covenant violation).
51
Id. at 411 & tbl. 6.
52
Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals
About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 294 (2004).
53
See, e.g., Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen
Course of Action, 16 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 22, 22-44 (1976).
54
Supra, Part I.2.
55
Lenders generally need to be gingerly about expressing their druthers too forcefully in this context.
50
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Kreme donuts.56 He took the company through its IPO in 2000. The ensuing
three years saw he compan
ock p ice
ad ple, and headcount
increased by 7,000.57 Then the second largest doughnut chain in the country,
K i p K eme became a high-profile, closely watched darling in retail and
investor circles after opening dozens of freestanding stores around the
co n . The compan had a ained a c l -like follo ing. 58
The da ling
a
a somewhat short-lived, however. By 2004,
K i p K eme pop la i had aned. Li engood ini iall blamed he lo ca b c a e fo he compan declining ale , b others believed the decline
was the result of improvident expansion the opening of too many stores too
quickly without adequate support and planning. 59 Its accounting practices
also triggered an SEC investigation,60 which left the company vulnerable to
a default declaration by its lenders for failing to file financial reports as
required under he compan
$150 million loan agreement. The company
had borrowed $91 million under the facility as of October 2004. By January
2005, the lenders had cut off further borrowing, leaving the company and
lenders to negotiate serial extensions of the default date while the company
searched for alternative financing.61 By this point, needless to say, the lenders
were well positioned to dictate terms. The compan anno nced Li engood
retirement as CEO, board chair, and director in a January press release.62
***
Having explained the mechanics of traditional lender governance, the
next Part explains the evolution of loan markets over the past few decades, a
period that has witnessed tremendous changes in debt markets, lending
56

Mark Maremont & Rick Brooks, Once-Hot Krispy Kreme Ousts Its CEO Amid Accounting Woes, WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
19,
2005);
available
at:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110605594997928805#:~:text=The%20man%20who%20transformed%20
Krispy,woes%20and%20a%20federal%20probe [https://perma.cc/X8QU-RSF7].
57
Andy Serwer, The Hole Story: How Krispy Kreme Became the Hottest Brand in America, FORTUNE (July
7,
2003);
available
at
https://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/
2003/07/07/345535/index.htm [https://perma.cc/Z642-FGAM].
58
Lynne Miller, Krispy Kreme Replaces Top Bosses, SUPERMARKET NEWS (Jan. 24, 2005); available at
https://www.supermarketnews.com/archive/krispy-kreme-replaces-top-bosses#comment-0.
59
Id.
60
Floyd Norris, Krispy Kreme Picks Turnaround Specialist, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2005); available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/19/business/krispy-kreme-picks-turnaround-specialist.html. At the same
time, Krispy Kreme announced that it would delay indefinitely the filing of its fiscal 2004 financial
statements, which would have to be restated, with the expectation that net income would be cut by as much
as 26% for the fiscal fourth quarter after correction of accounting errors. Mark Maremont & Rick Brooks,
Fresh Woes Batter Krispy Kreme; Doughnut Firm to Restate Results, Delay SEC Filing; Shares Take a 15%
Tumble, Wall St. J. (Jan. 5, 2005); available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110484914816116399.
61
By March 25, 2005, Krispy Kreme had not found an alternative lender, though it did succeed in pushing
its default date back to April 11, 2005. Associated Press, Krispy Kreme Gets Extension, N.Y. TIMES (Mar
26, 2005); available at https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/26/business/krispy-kreme-gets-extension.html.
62
Press Release, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc., Krispy Kreme Announces Management Changes (Jan. 18,
2005); available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=120929&p-irol-newsArticle&ID=663642.
The p e elea e al o no ed he compan
ecen eep ale decline : Fo he eigh eek ended Decembe
26, 2004, systemwide and average weekly sales per factory store decreased by approximately 18% and 25%,
e pec i el , f om he p io ea co e ponding eek . Id.
The press release also announced the appointment of a consulting and crisis management group to run the
company, that the company was barred from further borrowing under its $150 million credit facility, and that
its lenders had agreed to defer the calling of a default pending further discussion. Id.
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practices, and the uses of debt, as well as the emergence of new debt
instruments.
II.

THE NEW LOAN MARKETS

New loan markets have emerged in the face of major changes to the
lending environment. I begin by describing traditional syndicated bank
lending. I then explain important changes in banking regulation and bank
lending markets that led to the skyrocketing supply and demand for leveraged
loans. Financial services deregulation that began in the late 1970s led to
increased competition to make loans. At the same time, with the leveraged
buyout boom of the 1980s, firms and investors became more comfortable
with riskier capital structures, happy to rely on risky debt both bank loans
and high-yield bonds to finance massive takeovers. Modernization of bank
capital rules also ultimately helped pushed banks toward an originate-todistribute model of lending. Together these various influences propelled a
market for the new risky loans.
A.

Traditional Syndicated Bank Lending

The typical bank loan to a public company is syndicated. A large
money center bank he lead bank negotiates the loan with the borrower
while it assembles the lending syndicate. 63 The lead bank takes the laboring
oar in performing due diligence on the borrower, and prospective syndicate
membe
picall el on he lead bank doc men a ion in pe fo ming hei
credit analyses.64 Once the syndicate is assembled and the loan is in place,
the lead bank which typically holds the largest stake in the loan 65 is
granted wide powers to act as agent for the syndicate, for which the lead bank
is paid a fee.66 It takes the lead in administering the loan, monitoring the
63

See Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence From Syndicated Loans,
62 J. FIN. 629, 633 (2007); Kamphol Panyagometh & Gordon S. Roberts, Private Information, Agency
Problems and Determinants of Loan Syndications: Evidence From 1987 1999, at 4 (Apr. 25, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=310003. The arranging
bank may underwrite the loan as well, in effect committing to extend the specified loan even before the
formation of the syndicate is complete.
64
See Barry Bobrow, Mercedes Tech, and Linda Redding, An Introduction to the Primary Market, in THE
HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 155, 179 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007);
Panyagometh & Roberts, supra note 63, at 5; Katerina Simons, Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?, NEW
ENGLAND ECON REV. 45, Jan. Feb. 1993, at 47, available at https://www.bostonfed.org//media/Documents/neer/neer193c.pdf.
65
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 1244; Sufi, supra note 63, at 633. But see Kristian Blickle,
Quirin Fleckenstein, Sebastian Hillenbrand & Anthony Saunders, The M h of he Lead A ange Sha e,
FED. RES. BANK NY, Staff Rpt. No. 922 (May 2020) (using Shared National Credit Program data).
66
The credit agreement spells out these relations among syndicate members. See Richard Wight, Warren
Cooke, & Richard Gray, Understanding the Credit Agreement, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS
AND TRADING supra note 64, at 209, 354. As competition among banks intensified and league tables became
a pop la de ice fo keeping co e among bank and anking hem, lead a ange began ca ing o ne
distinguishing roles and accompanying titles to induce participation in their syndicates. New and largely
ceremonial i le incl de admini a i e agen ,
ndica ion agen ,
doc men a ion agen , and
managing agen , hich ma al o indica e ome ha ing of f nc ion that had traditionally been performed
by the sole lead bank. See Steve Miller, Players in the Market, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS
AND TRADING supra note 64, at 47, 50.
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borrower and communicating with firm management on behalf of the
syndicate, and disseminating information within the syndicate. 67 When a
borrower violates a covenant or defaults, the lead bank plays a central role in
investigating and recommending a course of action to the syndicate.68
As the arranger for the loan and its primary monitor and administrator,
the lead bank typically enjoys informational advantages over other syndicate
members. One might therefore worry that the lead bank could behave
opportunistically toward syndicate members for example by syndicating
poor quality loans or shirking on its monitoring duties. As the agent for the
syndicate, the lead bank reaps only a pro rata benefit from diligent
monitoring sharing with the entire lender group while it enjoys all the
benefits from shirking.69 Lead banks and other private lenders may also sell
their loans in liquid secondary loan markets. This ready exit option may
create moral hazard, encouraging lax credit analysis in the origination process
or weaker monitoring after the loan is made.70
Traditionally, lead banks had reputational stakes in their treatment of
syndicate members. Far from behaving opportunistically, lead banks would
in fact syndicate loans of higher ex ante quality in larger proportions, 71 and
would retain larger proportions of riskier loans. 72 Lead banks would also
syndicate a larger proportion of loans to borrowers whose creditworthiness
could be expected to hold up over time, as measured by ex post credit
ratings.73 Mo e gene all , lead bank ep a ion a fai hf l agen imp o ed
67

Sufi, supra note 63, at 632 33.
Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private
Credit Agreements, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 159 (2009).
69
For example, the lead bank might decide to devote more resources to originating new loans an
activity that generates fees for the lead bank rather than monitoring existing syndicated loans, as to which
risk is shared.
70
See Gary B. Gorton & George G. Pennacchi, Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Nonmarketable
Assets, 35 J. MONETARY ECON. 389, 391 (1995) (discussing moral hazard in the secondary loan market).
Gi en o igina ing lende likel info ma ional ad an age o e econda ma ke p cha e , i migh no
be surprising if lower quality loans were more likely to trade than those of higher quality. Especially given
he eme ging o igina e-to-di ib e model of ndica ion in which the lead arranger anticipates selling
large portions of a given loan to institutional investors in secondary markets shortly after origination
arrangers may be less concerned about careful credit analysis or subsequent monitoring than if they expected
to hold the loans for longer periods. See Antje Berndt & Anurag Gupta, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
in the Originate-to-Distribute Model of Bank Credit (Oct. 24, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290312; Greg Nini, How Non-Banks Increased the Supply of
Bank Loans: Evidence from Institutional Term Loans (Mar. 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108818 (documenting the boom in syndicating leverage loan
tranches to nonbank institutional investors).
71
See Steven A. Dennis & Donald J. Mullineaux, Syndicated Loans, 9 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 404,
424 (testing for ex ante quality); see also Kamphol Panyagometh & Gordon S. Roberts, Loan Syndicate
Structure: Evidence from Ex Post Risk 3 4 (Jan. 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1083707 (finding that lead banks syndicate greater proportions of loans
to ex post higher quality borrowers as measured by bond ratings).
72
See Simons, supra note 64, at 49 tbl.3 (showing that the proportion of a syndicated loan retained by
he lead bank inc ea e i h he e e i of he bo o e c edi p oblem , a
b e en l de e mined b
bank e amine loan ali cla ifica ion ); S fi, supra note 63, at 633. For more opaque borrowers, that
require greater due diligence and monitoring, the lead bank generally retains a larger share of the loan and
forms a more concentrated syndicate, with lenders that are clo e o he bo o e bo h geog aphicall and
in terms of prior lending relationships. Id.
73
Panyagometh & Roberts, supra note 71, at 24.
68
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their ability to arrange syndications.74 These findings suggest that lead banks
valued their reputations, which induced them to monitor conscientiously
despite the risk diversification from syndication.
The lead bank also typically did not sell its stake, 75 preferring instead
to preserve its relationships with both the borrower and its syndicate
members, who not only depended on the lead bank for monitoring services,76
b ag eed o join he ndica e el ing a lea in pa on he lead bank
continuing involvement in the loan. Lead banks also often constrained resale
by syndicate members, imposing requirements that might include lead bank
and even borrower consent. 77 Lead banks and borrowers could plausibly be
concerned about syndicate size and composition, since all other things being
equal, a larger syndicate makes collective decisionmaking more difficult. 78
Holdout problems also increase with syndicate size, 79 which may be
e peciall o bling hen he bo o e di e e i e a modifica ion of
the loan.80
Lenders in general also anticipated potential secondary market
p cha e conce n abo mo al ha a d i h e pec o moni o ing, as well
as adverse selection. 81 Selling lenders would not always sell their entire stake
in a loan, often retaining a portion to assure purchasers of both the quality of
he loan and he elle
con in ing ake in moni o ing he bo o e .
Consistent with this implicit assurance, loan sellers typically retained larger
portions of riskier loans.82 Loans that were ultimately sold also contained
more restrictive covenants than loans that were not sold.83 These tighter
covenants, by putting borrowers on a tighter leash, helped address both

74
See Dennis & Mullineaux, supra note 71, a 407 (finding ha lead bank
cce in ndica ing
larger percentages of their loans is positively associated with reputational measures).
75
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 1244.
76
See Panyagometh & Roberts, supra note 71, a 3 (de c ibing he lead bank ole a he delega ed
monitor for the syndicate); Sufi, supra note 63, a 632 (no ing he lead a ange
ole a he ndica e
primary monitor);. For their part, borrowers generally expect and prefer a durable relationship with their lead
bank, which ha peciali ed kno ledge of i bo o e b ine and financial condi ion. If he lead bank
exits by selling its loan, the borrower may be left with a different agent bank that it has never worked with
and that may not be to its liking.
77
Sang Whi Lee & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring, Financial Distress, and the Structure of
Commercial Lending Syndicates, 33 FIN. MGMT. 107, 111 (2004). Forty-four percent of the transactions in
their sample of syndicates loans from 1987 1995 included a requirement for lead bank consent for loan
resale. Id. at 117.
78
Modification of a syndicated loan requires a vote among the members. For major changes in
principal, interest, maturity, or collateral unanimity is typically required. For technical violations or
covenant waivers, a simple majority or supermajority will typically suffice. See Sufi, supra note 63, at 633.
79
Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995).
80
See Lee & Mullineaux, supra note 77, at 111. The effect of loan sale restrictions may be ambiguous
in terms of reducing holdout problems, however. Originating syndicates tend to be larger and loan
concentrations lower for loans with resale constraints. These liquidity constraints make the loan less attractive
to participants, who take smaller shares as a result. Id. at 120 21.
81
That is, potential purchasers may fear that sellers only want to dump their bad loans.
82
Gorton & Pennacchi, supra note 70, at 408 & tbl.5; cf. Berndt & Gupta, supra note 70 (finding
evidence of bank moral hazard insofar as firms whose loans are sold have worse risk adjusted stock returns
over the three years following the loan sale compared to firms whose loans are not sold).
83
Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships 2
(FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research Working Paper No. WP 2007-04,2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=920877.
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presale moral hazard and adverse selection. 84 Tighter covenants set quick
triggers for intervention, so that even a lender expecting to sell its loan would
be prompted to investigate earlier and more often than with loose covenants,
if for no other reason than to approve a waiver of any violation. Tighter
covenants also helped mitigate a loan p cha e info ma ional di ad an age
by offering the same quick trigger for intervention that the seller enjoyed. 85
Overall, the evidence suggests that while syndication and secondary
loan trading might theoretically have dampened bank
moni o ing
incentives, lead banks and selling banks anticipated and addressed this
concern for the benefit of syndicate members and loan purchasers,
respectively. Lead banks understood their reputational stakes in refraining
from opportunism in a syndication. Both lead banks and selling banks took
steps to bond themselves as monitors.86
B.

Demand for Leveraged Loans

In this section, I describe the evolution from traditional lending to a
new and riskier loan market, driven in part by banking deregulation, in part
by the advent of junk bonds and the 1980s leveraged buyout boom, in part by
modernized bank capital rules, and in part by the advent of securitization. I
also discuss the misgivings of regulators and other debt market observers
conce ned i h he ne loan ma ke appe i e fo i k.
1.

Banking Deregulation
Consolidation

and

Financial

Fi m

Banking deregulation had important effects on lenders and lending
markets. Beginning in the late 1970s, bank loan markets changed
dramatically, and new forms of bank lending emerged, as states deregulated
intrastate branching and interstate banking. 87 Before deregulation,
84

Moreover, tighter covenants help inc ea e bo o e deb capaci b making hei loan mo e
saleable in secondary markets. Id.
85
More generally, bank monitoring continues to have value in the presence of bank debt trading. Amar
Gande and Anthony Saunders find that bank loan announcements are associated with positive stock price
eac ion , e en hen he bo o e loan al ead
ade on he econda ma ke . See Amar Gande &
Anthony Saunders, Are Banks Still Special When There Is a Secondary Market for Loans?, 67 J. FIN. 1649
(2012). This result holds even for distressed firms, for which reduced incentives for bank monitoring would
ex ante be expected to have the most adverse effects. Id. Additionally, the inception of trading in the
bo o e bank deb al o elici a po i i e ock p ice reaction, suggesting that bank monitoring and the
secondary market offer complementary sources of information about borrower firms. Id.
86
Charles Whitehead has offered a reason to embrace loan markets as a facilitator of lender
governance. More complete credit markets may improve governance through transparent pricing of credit
i k. In he ame a ha ock p ice info m e i holde abo he fi m condi ion and p o pec , li id
c edi ma ke ma offe p ice ignal o c edi o abo a fi m c editworthiness, enabling those creditors
to adjust their relations with the firm. Creditors might come to rely on these credit market price signals as a
supplement to or substitute for traditional covenants and monitoring. Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution
of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP L. 641, 660 (2009).
87
Anthony J. Crawford et al., Bank CEO Pay-Performance Relations and the Effects of Deregulation, 68 J.
BUS. 231, 233 (1995) (noting that most states required reciprocity); see R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia,
Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 105, 109 (1995)
(describing state-level deregulation of interstate banking beginning in the early 1980s).
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commercial banking was a relatively clubby, cozy business, with banks
operating in fairly protected, geographically segmented markets. 88 Not only
was interstate banking prohibited, 89 but most states limited the size and
geographical scope of banks operating within their borders. 90 These
constraints effectively limited the territorial scope of competition, carving up
banking markets within each state. At the start of banking deregulation, only
twelve states allowed unrestricted branching. 91 However, by 1990, thirtyeight states and the District of Columbia had removed all intrastate branching
restrictions.92
Interstate banking received a boost at the federal level in 1982: an
amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act93 sanctioned interstate
acquisition of failed banks and thrifts regardless of state law. 94 Many states
responded to the Act by entering into reciprocal multistate agreements freely
allowing bank acquisitions among participant states. By 1989, forty-four
states and the District of Columbia allowed some interstate banking. 95
Continuing this trend, the Riegle Neal Act (RNA) formally unleashed
interstate banking across all states in 1994. 96 Then in 1999, the Gramm
Leach Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act (GLB Act) formally
repealed the Depression-era barriers among banking, insurance, and
securities activities. 97 This allowed for the formation of multiline financial

88

See generally Crawford et al., supra note 87 (investigating bank CEO compensation from 1976 to 1988);
Vicente Cuñat & Maria Guadalupe, Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial
Sectors, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 495, 496 (2009) (testing effects of banking deregulation from 1992 to 2002).
89
Interstate banking enables a bank holding company (BHC) to own and operate banks in more than one
state. Under the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, states enjoyed the power
to block interstate banking barring a BHC from acquiring a bank outside its home state without the approval
of he a ge bank
a e. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (2006).
90
Kevin J. Stiroh & Philip E. Strahan, Competitive Dynamics of Deregulation: Evidence from U.S. Banking,
35 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 801, 806 (2003). In ni banking a e , b anching a
rictly
prohibited. In effect, each bank was permitted only one place of business its unit bank within the state.
Other states allowed only limited branching. Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 808 tbl.1.
93
12 U.S.C. § 1842.
94
Garn St. Germain Depository Institutions Act (Garn St. Germain Act) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320,
§ 116, 96 Stat. 1469, 1476 79 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823); see also Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E.
Strahan, What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching
Restrictions, 114 Q.J. ECON. 1437, 1442 (1999) (describing the impact of the Garn St. Germain Act). The
range of permissible products that depository institutions could offer was broadened beginning in 1980. For
example, DIDMCA preempted state usury laws capping mortgage interest rates, finance charges, and
discount points. DIDMCA, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501, 94 Stat. 161, 161 63 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f7a). The Garn St. Germain Act authorized depository institutions to offer money market deposit accounts.
Garn St. Germain Act § 327 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503) (directing the Deposit Institutions Deregulation
Commi ee o p om lga e le allo ing depo i o in i ion o offe a ne depo i acco n di ec l
equivalent to and competitive i h mone ma ke m al find ). The Garn St. Germain Act also preempted
state law restrictions on due-on-sale clauses. Garn St. Germain Act § 341 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701j3(b)(1)).
95
Stiroh & Strahan, supra note 90, at 808 tbl.1.
96
Riegle Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat.
2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
97
Gramm Leach Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999).
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services firms in the form of bank holding companies.98 These important
deregulatory statutes pushed commercial banks further out of their cozy
protected markets,99 forcing them not only to compete with one another
across state lines,100 but also to compete with investment banks and other
diversified financial firms with insurance, securities, and mutual fund
businesses. Deregulation initially had salutary procompetitive effects.
Increased competition led to greater growth opportunities in commercial
banking.101 A he ame ime, bank traditional financial intermediation
business model came under stress. Funding became more problematic, as
consumers discovered money market funds and other alternatives to bank
deposits. On the lending side, as well, commercial banks faced new
competition as investment banks began to offer debt financing in nontraditional forms short-term commercial paper, for example. 102
The convergence of activities among banks and securities firms also
spurred the largest financial firms to grow larger. Deregulation drove
extensive consolidation among investment and commercial banks. The mo
striking fact about the industry . . . is the amount of consolidation that has
taken place. 103 Between 1979 and 1994, the total number of banking
organizations dropped by 36.4%, while gross total assets increased by 23.4%
in real terms.104 A op- en g o p of global ec i ie nde i e emained
virtually unchanged from 2001-07,105 and those ten firms together took in
nearly 60% of global proceeds from securities underwriting for 2005-07.106
The big h ee U.S. bank JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and
Citigroup controlled about 60% of the U.S. syndicated lending market
from 2000-07. Around the same time, the big fo
U.S. ec i ie fi m
98

Id. Before the GLB Act, BHC structures were permitted through the regulatory discretion of federal
banking regulators. Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm Leach Bliley,
25 J. CORP. L. 691, 692 (2000). Perhaps the most significant effect of the GLB Act was to allow investment
banks to acquire commercial banks. Id. at 694. Commercial banks were already being allowed by regulators
to acquire investment banking ope a ion b he ime of he GLB Ac pa age. Id.
99
See Cuñat & Guadalupe, supra note 88, at 497.
100
On the heels of the RNA, the total number of bank branches per capita in the United States increased, as
did the average number of banks operating at the state level and the average number of states in which a bank
operated. See Astrid A. Dick, Nationwide Branching and Its Impact on Market Structure, Quality, and Bank
Performance, 79 J. BUS. 567, 585 (2006).
101
The costs and pricing of banking services fell. See Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, Entry Restrictions,
Industry Evolution, and Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence from Commercial Banking, 41 J.L. & ECON. 239,
249 53 (1998). States that dismantled intrastate branching restrictions saw faster growth after deregulation.
See Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch
Deregulation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 639, 639 (1996). Interstate competition also led to reallocation of assets to
more efficient banks. See Stiroh & Strahan, supra note 90, at 804.
102
Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged Loan Market, 39 J.
CORP. L. 725, 739 (2014).
103
Berger Kashyap Scalise, The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip
It's Been, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 55, 66 (1995).
104
Id. at 66-67 & tbl. 1.
105
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins
of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. RE . 963, 980 (2009). Thi g o p a comp i ed of he big
h ee U.S. banks Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of America three major foreign banks Credit
Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and UBS and he big fo U.S. ec i ie fi m Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley,
Goldman Sachs, and Lehman Brothers. Id.
106
Id. at 981.
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Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and Lehman Brothers
became active players in the leveraged loan market. That market saw rapid
growth in response o in e o demand fo highe -yielding investments
and p i a e e i fi m need fo le e aged b o financing. 107 Global
leveraged lending grew from $250 billion in 1996 to $1.6 trillion in 2007.108
This explosion of leveraged lending fueled a global LBO boom.109
2.

Junk Bonds and Leveraged Buyouts

Up h o gh he 1970 , p blic fi m balance hee
ee
ie
conservative. New public bond issues were typically investment grade,
implying very low default risk, but also offering financing only for the most
creditworthy firms. During this period, bank lending was also fairly
straightforward, as described above. Banks generally held their loans to
maturity; selling loans was rare. Relationship banking was the norm, and
bank p i a e info ma ion gleaned f om moni o ing hei bo o e
a an
important asset, giving each bank some competitive edge with respect to its
familiar borrowers.110 Thi a he adi ional o igina e-to-hold model of
syndicated lending, as compared to he mo e ecen o igina e-to-di ib e
model we discuss below.111
The advent of junk bonds and the leveraged buyout boom of the 1980s
taught companies to get comfortable with riskier capital structures.112 Rather
than simply husbanding debt for operational needs, firms could tap
burgeoning debt markets for acquisition purposes. Private equity firms
regularized the practice of borrowing large sums to take firms private,
typically using a mix of bank loans and junk bonds, thereby increasing
demand for both. This demand in turn led to more and more syndicated
lending, which enabled banks to diversify risk by sharing the funding of large
corporate loans.113
107

Id. at 982-83.
Comm. on the Global Fin. System, Private Equity and Leveraged Finance Markets 11 graph 2.2, 17-21
(CGFS Papers, Working Paper No. 30, 2008), available at www.bis.org/publ/cgfs30.htm. By 2004, global
leveraged lending was at $700 billion; it hit $900 billion in 2005 and $1.2 trillion in 2006. Id.
109
Viral V. Acharya et al., Private Equity: Boom and Bust?, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2007, at 44-46,
49-50; Edward I. Altman, Global Debt Markets in 2007: New Paradigm or the Great Credit Bubble?, 19 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2007, at 17, 24-25. More than half the leveraged loans issued in the U.S. and
Europe from 2004-07 were used to finance LBOs and other corporate transactions. Comm. on the Global
Fin. System, supra note 108, 14 graph 2.6.
110
E.g., Sreedhar T. Bharath, Sandeep Dahiya, Anthony Saunders, and Anand Srinivasan, Lending
Relationships and Loan Contract Terms, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1141, 1141-42 (2011) (showing that reduced
information asymmetry leads to lower loan spreads, especially for opaque borrowers).
111
Simons, supra note 64, at 45-46; de Fontenay, supra note 102, at 739.
112
So-called j nk bond , al o efe ed o a high-yield debt, are riskier than investment grade bonds. Bonds
i h a S anda d & Poo
a ing belo BBB- o a Mood
a ing belo Baa3 a e gene all con ide ed belo
investment grade. S&P GLOBAL, A SYNDICATED LOAN PRIMER 9 (April 2016); available at
https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/2016%20US%20Loan%20Primer.pdf. A leveraged buyout is a merger
transaction in which a private equity firm pays for control of the target using primarily borrowed funds, much
of hich i colla e ali ed b he a ge a e . [ci e]
113
Bridget Marsh & Tess Virmani, Loan Syndications and Trading: An Overview of the Syndicated Loan
Market, in LENDING & SECURED FINANCE 2 (2020), available at https://iclg.com/practice-areas/lending-andsecured-finance-laws-and-regulations/01-loan-syndications-and-trading-an-overview-of-the-syndicatedloan-market.
108
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One consequence of the greater comfort with more highly leveraged
capital structures has been the expansion of leveraged lending bank lending
to below-investment-grade firms. Because leveraged loans face higher
default risk than investment grade loans, borrowers face steeper pricing for
both loan spreads and arranger fees. The prospective high returns to lenders
attracted significant investor interest beginning in the mid-1990s, as nonbank financial in i ion ( in i ional lenders, also sometimes called
hado bank ) jumped into the leveraged loan market. 114 CLOs, mutual
funds, pension funds, and insurance companies have been the most active
institutional lenders in the leveraged loan market.115
3.

Modernizing Bank Capital

Modernized bank capital rules helped to shape the emergence and
contours of the leveraged loan market. Beginning in the 1970s, central
bankers in ten economically advanced countries began to meet regularly to
craft and coordinate improvements to the quality of banking supervision
worldwide. This group became the Basel Committee,116 which over the past
decades has established international standards and practices for banking
regulation. Among other things, the Basel Committee introduced and refined
bank capital rules. Bank capital acts as a buffer against losses, analogous to
corporate equity, and banking regulations specify minimum capital
requirements for banks to operate. The minimum capital requirements are
expressed as a ratio of capital to assets. During the 1980s, the Basel
Committee introduced risk weighting for assets. Different types of assets
implicate different types and levels of risk, so the Basel risk-weighted assets
(RWA) approach assigns bank assets to various risk categories, with riskier
categories requiring more capital. For example, under Basel I, commercial
loans were weighted at 100%; residential mortgages were weighted at only
50%; and sovereign debt incurred a 0% weighting that is, sovereign debt
required no corresponding capital buffer. Over time, the Basel Committee set
three important minimum capital-to-RWA ratios: one for co e o ie 1
capital; a similar ratio for total capital, which includes tier 1 capital plus

114

Allison A. Taylor & Ruth Yang, Evoluation of the Primary and Secondary Leveraged Loan Markets, in
THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 24 (2007) ( The e nonbank b e inc ea ed
demand for leveraged loan products, thereby enabling the larger agent banks to underwrite and distribute
inc ea ingl bigge loan . ) (he einaf e HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS).
115
Jerome H. Powell, Business Debt and Our Dynamic Financial System, Remarks by Jerome H. Powell,
Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 4 & fig. 4 (May 20, 2019).
116
The Committee has since expanded to include 45 institutions from 28 jurisdictions. BANK OF
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE,
available at
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm.
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additional items;117 and a common e i ie 1 o CET1 a io, which
uses a definition of capital narrower than tier 1.118
Consistent with the modern portfolio theory behind these risk-based
capital rules, banks were pushed to diversify their loan portfolios. 119 The new
capital rules deterred banks from holding just a relative handful of large loans
confined to a particular region or locality. Instead, banks were incentivized
to hold larger passels of smaller loans that were geographically more
balanced.120 More generally, by the early 2000s, with portfolio management
being the order of the day, a bank could no longer simply originate loans
based on a one-time risk assessment and hold the loans to maturity. Instead,
portfolio rebalancing meant some amount of loan selling. So rather than
continuing with a straight originate-to-hold approach to lending, banks began
to pare their portfolios to reduce regulatory capital costs. One 2002 survey of
41 prominent banks explored their experience with the nascent practice of
portfolio management. The survey showed that 73% of respondents had
transferred a loan to a CLO, and that eg la o capi al concerns were the
most important motivation.121 Asked to rank four tools for loan portfolio
management, respondents ranked loan ale and ading as the second most
important tool, af e app o al/ disapproval of new business and renewals/
non ene al of e i ing b ine . 122 With new technology to measure risk
and diversification, banks learned to optimize their portfolios and enhance
their returns with the judicious selling of loans. 123
A secondary loan market thus emerged, with originate-to-distribute
lending and plenty of non-bank lenders to populate that market.

117

Tier 1 includes common ockholde e i , nonc m la i e pe pe al p efe ed ock, mino i in e e
in consolidated subsidiaries, and some other items. Total capital incorporates tier 2 capital, which includes
allowances for loan losses, cumulative preferred stock, long-term preferred stock, and some subordinated
debt. Tier 2 capital also cannot exceed tier 1 capital. Joseph G. Haubrich, A Brief History of Bank Capital
Requirements in the United States, ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 4 & 6 n.6 (FRB Cleveland) No. 2020-05 (Feb.
28, 2020).
118
Id. at 4. Basel III and the Dodd-F ank Ac al o c ea ed capi al b ffe
fo he la ge bank . A capi al
conservation buffer (CCB) precludes large banks from making capital distributions if their capital is less than
2.5% above the minimum ratio. Global systematically important banks (GSIBs) face a special surcharge
meant to offset systemic risk. GSIBs are also required to meet a total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC)
threshold, which is a minimum ratio of equity plus long-term debt. The requirement for a countercyclical
capi al b ffe (CC B) i mean o ai e bank capi al e i emen d ing an economic e pan ion, e en iall
to moderate a potentially overheating economy. Id. at 5.
119
E.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, Comprehensive Version, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS (June 2006), available at https://www.fsb.org/2006/06/cos_060601/. See also de Fontenay,
supra note 102, at 739-41.
120
Whitehead, supra note 86, at 654-65 (no ing ha ne eg la o capi al e i emen made i mo e
e pen i e fo bank o con in e he lending b ine a he had befo e, and man [bank ] n[ed] o a
defensive, portfolio-based strategy in o de o minimi e hei o e all c edi co . ).
121
Charles Smithson, Stuart Brannan, David Mengle & Mark Zmiewski, Results from the 2002 Survey of
Credit Portfolio Management Practices 5 (2002); available at https://studylib.net/doc/8175108/2002-surveyof-credit-portfolio-management-practices. Most of the institutions (81%) were commercial banks
headquartered in North America or Europe. Id. at 2.
122
Id. The mean ank fo loan ale and ading a 2.74. The mean ank fo app o al/ di app o al of
ne b ine
a 1.10. Id.
123
Whitehead, supra note 86, at 655-56 & n.103 (noting the development of credit portfolio modeling and
ne me hod fo mea ing loan po folio i k and e n cha ac e i ic ).
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4.

Securitization: Collateralized Loan Obligations

CLOs deserve special mention. Sixty-some percent of outstanding
leveraged loans are securitized:124 the loan is sold to a special purpose vehicle
(SPV), hich cceed o he loan ca h flo and control rights. The SPV
buys many loans, or slices of syndicated loans, and then issues securities
colla e ali ed loan obliga ion , o CLO to investors, backed by the cash
flows of the loans in the SPV.125 The CLO securities are tranched, such that
the senior-most securities are the safest and most highly rated. More junior
tranches enjoy a higher interest rate for having to shoulder greater risk. The
lowest tranches typically suffer the first losses in the collateral pool.
Securitization is an ever-expanding tool of modern finance, in both its sheer
dollar volume and the steadily growing variety of its sources of cash flows.
CLOs have become the major holders of leveraged loans. A
conventional wisdom suggests that CLO loans face not only weak covenants
but also anemic monitoring, though existing evidence appears mixed. 126 For
present purposes, we note CLO securitization as an important driver of the
leveraged loan market.
C.

The Shape of Leveraged Lending

With the metamorphosis to syndicated originate-to-distribute lending
and loan trading, it was a short step to creating different types of loans for
different types of lenders for the leveraged loan market. While banks still
typically act as arrangers, they traditionally prefer to hold what is known as
p o a a deb , a package ha includes a revolving loan with traditional
financial covenants, 127 and an amortizing term loan (typically referred to as
124

Powell, supra note 115, at 4 (noting that 62% of then-outstanding leveraged loans were held by CLOs).
Mutual funds, the next largest holders of leveraged loans, own about 20% of the market. Id.
125
CLO i gene all used to refer to not only the loan-backed bonds but also the entire structured finance
transaction or entity. A typical CLO may include over a hundred different loans, with the average loan size
ranging from $2 million to $3 million. Efraim Benmelech, Jennifer Dlugosz & Victoria Ivashina,
Securitization without Adverse Selection, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 91, 94 (2012). In 2015, the average CLO held
$500 million to $600 million in principal amount of loans spread over an average of 140 borrowers. Stavros
Peristani & João A.C. Santos, Investigating the Trading Activity of CLO Portfolio Managers, LIBERTY
STREET
ECON.
(Aug.
3,
2015);
available
at
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2015/08/investigating-the-trading-activity-of-clo-portfoliomanagers.html.
126
Compare Yihui Wang & Han Xia, Do Lenders Still Monitor When They Can Securitize Loans?, 27 REV.
FIN. STUD. 2354 (2014); Vitaly M. Board & João A.C. Santos, Does Securitization of Corporate Loans Lead
to Riskier Lending?, 47 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 415 (2015) (finding that securitized leveraged loans
perform worse than non-securitized loans); with Berlin, Nini & Yu, supra note 127; Benmelech, et al., supra
note 125 (finding no consistent evidence that securitized leveraged loans performed worse than unsecuritized
loans).
127
Mitchell Berlin, Greg Nini & Edison G. Yu, Concentration of Control Rights in Leveraged Loan
Syndicates, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 249, 250 (2020) (noting that the line of credit in a leveraged loan deal nearly
always contains traditional financial covenants, even if no term loan does). A revolving loan is an unfunded
loan that allows the borrower repeatedly to draw and then repay funds as the borrower wishes during the life
of the loan, up to a specified aggregate limit, much like a credit card. Interest is charged only for the periods
and amounts that funds are outstanding. Banks typically originate and manage revolving loans. An amortizing
term loan typically requires regular periodic payments of the same amount over the life of the loan, with each
payment consisting of two components: (a) an amount that pays off the accrued interest from the preceding
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the TLA).128 The package is pro rata insofar as each lender in the syndication
commits to a share of the revolver equal to its share of the TLA.129
Institutional lenders, by contrast, prefer riskier loans, typically nonamo i ing e m loan , called TLB . The B efe o he b lle na e of
the loan. Maturity is typically longer than for the TLA loan, and in the
absence of amortization, the borrower makes only regular periodic interest
payments over the life of the loan. The entire principal amount ( he b lle )
is due at maturity.130 In i ional lende f nd he lion ha e of le e aged
loans.131 Loan credit ratings and secondary market trading standards have
greatly facilitated institutional trading. 132
Institutional lenders can take on these riskier loans because they are
free of the capital requirements and stringent regulation applied to
commercial banks. This regulatory differential has led to a symbiotic
arbitrage, where banks arrange risky loans that they are not willing to hold
on their own books, but instead sell to institutional lenders.133 This approach
has facilitated he o igina e-to-di ib e model of loan ndica ion. While
continuing their traditional relationship lending, banks also create
institutional tranches for the shadow banks in the form of riskier TLBs. Like
the revolving loans, leveraged term loans are typically secured by first
priority liens on collateral, sharing equal priority with the revolving loan. As
syndicated lending has become more specialized, it has also become common
period; and (b) an amount for reduction of principal. Over the life of the loan, the interest component
decreases monotonically while the principal component does just the opposite, such that the final payment
retires the remaining principal amount, as well as the remaining small sliver of interest due. [cite]
128
An amortizing loan is a loan with a repayment schedule of equal periodic payments over the life of the
loan. Each periodic payment includes some repayment of principal, as well as interest on the remaining
principal amount. Payments early on the life of the loan are comprised primarily of interest, with just a small
principal repayment component. With each succeeding payment, the interest component decreases because
the unpaid principal amount decreases with each payment while the principal repayment component
increases. The very last payment, which retires the loan, is comprised almost entirely of principal, with just
a sliver of interest. See Julia Kagan, Amortized Loan, INVESTOPEDIA (updated Oct. 30, 2020), available at
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/amortized_loan.asp.
129
S&P GLOBAL, LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA (LCD): LEVERAGED LOAN PRIMER 8 (2020);
available
at
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/documents/lcd-primer-leveragedloans_ltr_updated.pdf. By the late 2000s, amortizing term loans became less common, as institutional lenders
preferred the revolver/ institutional term loan (i.e., non-amortizing) arrangement. Id. at 6.
130
Id. at 6; HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS, supra note 114, a 717. Thi b lle fea e i no
necessarily as draconian as it may sound. Corporate borrowers will typically honor their repayment
commitment by refinancing taking out a new loan to repay the maturing loan. When multiple institutional
term loan tranches are created at the same time, they are typically named in alphabetical order, which
coincides with maturity order. For example, the TLB may mature in six years, the TLC in seven years, and
so on. Id.
131
Banks held less than 8% of leveraged loans as of the end of 2018. Powell, supra note 115, at 5 & fig. 4.
132
In 2007, institutional lenders funded 62% of primary leveraged loan issuance. Victoria Ivashina & Zheng
Sun, Institutional Demand Pressure and the Cost of Corporate Loans,99 J. FIN. ECON. 500, 501(2011).
133
Moreover,
There is only so much safety and soundness regulators can do about this, for much of the market is
populated by nonbank lenders and nonbank purchasers and so lies outside of their immediate reach . . .
[R]egulatory initiatives against the banks are thought to have played a causative role in the nonbank
surge.
Bratton & Levitin, supra note 16, at 104. See also Andrew Berlin, Regulated Banks Soften Stance on
Leveraged Lending Guidance, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2018) (explaining the regulatory easing by the Fed and
OCC enabling debt packages with leverage of up to 7.75 times in 2018, as compared to the six-times leverage
cap in 2013).
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ha bank hold onl e ol e , lea ing he bo o e
e m loan o he
134
shadow banks.
With debt investors continually on the hunt for higher yields, the US
leveraged loan market has exploded since the financial crisis, more than
doubling in size,135 as Figure 1 shows below. By the end of 2019, the
leveraged loan market was worth $1.2 trillion, with institutional lenders
holding 90% of that market.136 A he ame ime, on he bo o e
ide, 70%
of US companies are rated below investment grade, 137 including household
names like Wend , He , Hil on Wo ld ide Holding , Jag a , and Uni ed
Airlines.
FIGURE 1: GROWTH IN LEVERAGED & COV-LITE LOANS
2000 2019 (JULY)

D.

Fear of Flying: Reg la o

Vie

Debt markets have become far more comfortable with riskier loans than
in previous years. Regulators, rating agencies, and other debt market
observers worry that market demand for leveraged loans has enabled

134

Edison Yu, Banking Trends: Measuring Cov-Lite Right, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILADELPHIA 3 (2018).
From the end of 2008 to Q1 2019, outstanding institutional leveraged loans grew by 101%. Frank MartinBuck, Leveraged Lending and Corporate Borrowing: Increased Reliance on Capital Markets, with Important
Bank Links, 13 FDIC Q. 41, 43 (2019).
136
Sierra, supra note 8. In the mid-1990s, banks funded more than 70% of institutional leveraged loans.
Martin-Buck, supra note 135, at 45.
137
SIFMA, LEVERAGE LENDING FAQ & FACT SHEET 2 (2019); available at https://www.sifma.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Leverage-Lending-FAQ.pdf.
135
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borrowers to cut deals with increasingly weaker covenants. 138 Historically,
leveraged loans typically included financial maintenance covenants. The
borrower committed to maintaining a certain ratio of debt to cash flow, for
example, or a cap on total debt. Virtually all leveraged loans included
maintenance covenants in the early 2000s. 139 By 2007, 29% of new loans
so-called co enan -li e o co -li e loan omitted these covenants.
In ead, loan migh incl de inc ence co enan , hich e i e
compliance with caps or ratios only when the borrower pursues a specified
significant action like issuing new debt or dividends, or making an
acquisition. While the proportion of cov-lite loans fell in the aftermath of the
financial crisis, cov-lite roared back through 2018 to comprise 85% of new
loans.140
In addition to weakened covenants and the associated corporate
governance implications, other risk-enhancing practices have emerged as
well in recent years. Not only has reported leverage increased, but the
g o ing p ac ice of ea ning add-back suggests that actual leverage may
be even more worrisome. With acquisitions, private equity buyouts, and other
extraordinary transactions, sponsors and targets naturally expect to show
synergies or operational improvements that justify valuations exceeding the
costs of the deal. With the understandable aim of presenting a fair picture of
he bo o e f
e ea ning follo ing an e ao dina
an ac ion, he
borrower often adds back non-recurring items that affect cash flows or
accruals.141
Lenders in turn will concur with borrowe
p a d adj men o
EBITDA to reflect this assumed augmentation of value. Borrowers of course
may end up overstating adjusted EBITDA through add-backs, which then
nde a e he a ge deb -to-EBITDA ratio, a typical baseline leverage
measure.142 Add-backs are becoming more and more common. Their
magnitudes have raised concerns from regulators. The Financial Stability
Board estimates EBITDA adjustments of 15-30% for incurrence covenants
138

William W. Bratton, Bond and Loan Covenants, Theory and Practice, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 461, 478-79
(2016). See also Aaron Weinman, Demand for Leveraged Loans Ignites Market, Concerns on Risk, REUTERS
(Feb. 5, 2020) ( In e o pocke a e fl h i h ca h looking fo a home, and bo o e ha e le e aged
this to either reprice their debt at ultra-low rates or obtain cheap new cash for acquisitions that may have been
difficult to execute a year ago. ).
139
Martin-Buck, supra note 135, at 44. One study of public company credit agreements from 1996 2005
found that almost 97 percent included at least one financial covenant. Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi,
Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation, 64 J. FIN. 1657, 1662 (2009).
140
Id.
141
For example, as part of the spin-off of Engility Holdings, Inc. by L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc. in
July, 2012, Engility entered into a $400 million credit agreement with Bank of America, as Administrative
Agen . Engili
defini ion of Con olida ed EBITDA runs for 520 words, and includes addbacks not only
fo in e e , a e , dep ecia ion, and amo i a ion. I al o add back ce ain non-cash stock-based
compen a ion e pen e , ce ain co a ing , ope a ing e pen e ed c ion and ne gie p ojec ed by the
Borrower in good faith to be realized . . . , ce ain e ao dina o non-recurring charges, expenses or
lo e ," and ce ain o he non-ca h cha ge , e pen e o lo e . CREDIT AGREEMENT, DATED AS OF JULY
17, 2012, AMONG ENGILITY HOLDINGS, INC., ENGILITY CORPORATION, BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT, AND THE LENDERS FROM TIME TO TIME PARTY HERETO 7-; available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1544229/000119312512309118/d381537dex101.htm.
142
Financial Stability Board, Vulnerabilities Associated with Leveraged Loans and Collateralised Loan
Obligations 9 (2019).
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in current deals.143 S die b bo h S anda d & Poo and Mood s show that
fi m o EBITDA p ojec ion of en fall ma e iall ho in he o ea
post-closing.144
While Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has expressed
confidence ha he banking
em i f ndamen all
onge and mo e
e ilien han d ing he financial c i i , he also offers some caution in mid2019:
Business debt has clearly reached a level that should give businesses
and investors reason to pause and reflect. . . . Many measures confirm
that the business sector has significantly increased its borrowing as
the economy has expanded over the past decade. Business debt
relative to the size of the economy is at historic highs. . . . And
investment-grade corporate debt has shifted closer to the edge of
speculative grade. . . . Among investment-grade bonds, a near-record
fraction is at the lowest rating . . . . [U]nderwriting standards have
weakened. With leveraged loans, covenants intended to protect
lenders may be an endangered species; more loans now feature high
debt-to-earnings ratios; and the use of optimistic projections . . . is
becoming more common.145
In his 2015 speech on financial stability, then-Fed Board Member Powell
made similar remarks about the dearth of covenants, no ing ha [p]rice and
non-price terms in the syndicated leveraged loan market have been highly
favorable to borrowers . . . . The share of loan agreements that lack traditional
main enance co enan inc ea ed o hi o ic high . 146
Ea lie , in p ing of 2013, U.S. bank eg la o had i ed In e agenc
G idance on Le e aged Lending (IGLL), offe ing o nd p ac ice fo
le e aged finance ac i i ie . The G idance cautioned that financial
in i ion ho ld . . . no nnece a il heigh en i k b o igina ing poo l
nde i en loan , and bemoaned ha deb ag eemen ha e f e en l
included features that provided relatively limited lender protection including

143

Id. a 9. C en deal co e deal h o gh he end of 2018. Id. at n.31.
S&P GLOBAL, When the Credit Cycle Turns: The EBITDA Add-Back Fallacy (Sept. 24, 2018), available
at https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/articles/when-the-credit-cycle-turns-the-ebitda-add-backfallacy; S&P GLOBAL, Comments-When the Cycle Turns: The Continued Attack of the EBITDA Add-Back
(Sept. 19, 2019), available at https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/190919-when-thecycle-turns-the-continued-attack-of-the-ebitda-add-back-11156255; MOODY S, Research: Announcement:
EMEA Spec-Grade Firms Are Making Higher Earnings Adjustments to Attract Investors (June 27, 2018),
available at https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-EMEA-spec-grade-firms-are-making-higherearnings-adjustments--PR_385895.
145
Powell, supra note 115, at 2-4. At the same time, Chairman Powell noted that capital levels and liquidity
are much higher at bank holding companies than before the financial crisis, and more generally that the
financial system is better prepared for an economic downturn, should it arise. Id. at 8, 11.
146
Jerome H. Powell, Financial Institutions, Financial Markets, and Financial Stability, Remarks by Jerome
H. Powell, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 11 & fig. 9 & 10 (Feb. 18, 2015).
144
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. . . the absence of meaningful maintenance covenants in loan agreements
and the participation of unregulated investors. 147
The Kansas City Fed has also recently raised concerns with the growing
absence of covenant protections:
[M]an ob e e concerns stem from reduced credit enhancement
protections on syndicated loans. Covenants and other borrower
protections have declined during the post-crisis period, likely leaving
lenders with less monitoring authority and fewer recourse channels
should borrowers default on their loans. . . . Declining borrower
protections could also lead to lower recovery rates than in the past if
firms were to default.148
III.

THE NEW LENDER GOVERNANCE

The rise in leveraged and cov-lite loans, and the increasing packaging
of these loans into CLOs, has created concerns about systemic risk and the
future of lender governance. Law and finance scholars worry that the
beneficent effects of lender governance may fall by the wayside as the
explosive demand for leveraged loans seems to lead to weakened covenants
and enforcement. The larger and more diverse institutional syndicates
associated with leveraged loans may create greater holdout opportunities and
renegotiation frictions. Going cov-lite tends to avoid these holdout problems,
thereby potentially streamlining the resolution of conflict among syndicate
members and the borrower. 149 Lender governance could weaken, however.
147

Emphasis supplied. In addi ion, he capi al
c e and epa men p o pec fo ome an ac ion . . .
ha e a ime been agg e i e, and managemen info ma ion
ems (MIS) at some institutions have
p o en le han a i fac o in acc a el agg ega ing e po e on a imel ba i . Boa d of Go e no of
the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation & Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending 1-2 (March 21, 2013). Studies show that banks
gene all did no eac hen IGLL a fi i ed. In ead, onl i h he Fed i ance of a cla if ing FAQ
on November 7, 2014 did banks respond. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation & Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) for
Implementing March 201 Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending (Nov. 7, 2014). The most heavily
supervised banks (subject to oversight by the Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee (LISCC)
reduced leveraged lending activity significantly, to levels below the pre-IGLL period. Market share for
LISCC banks declined by 11 (5) percentage points in number (volume) of leveraged loans from November
2014 December 2015. Non-LISCC banks did not change their leveraged lending levels in response to the
IGLL or the subsequent clarifying FAQ. Nonbanks increased their leveraged lending throughout, taking
significant market share away from banks. By number of loans, nonbanks increased market share by over
50%; dollar volume more than doubled. This should not be too surprising, since supervisory guidance directly
affects only banks. Post-FAQ, borrowers from a LISCC bank were also more likely to switch to nonbank
lenders. Sooji Kim, Matthew C. Plosser & João A.C. Santos, Macroprudential Policy and the Revolving Door
of Risk: Lessons from Leveraged Lending Guidance, 34 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 17, 17-18 (2018). Similar
results obtain for US and foreign banks versus nonbanks. Paul Calem, Ricardo Correa & Seung Jung Lee,
Prudential Policies and Their Impact on Credit in the United States, 42 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 1, 14 & 15
tbl. 11 (2020). Of course, moving risky lending away from banks and toward nonbanks may not have reduced
financial system risk overall.
148
W. Blake Marsh & Seung Jung Lee, Wha D i ing Le e aged Loan Sp ead , FED. RES. BANK OF
KANSAS CITY: THE MACRO BULLETIN 4 (Feb. 27, 2019).
149
Matthew T. Billett, Redouane Elkamhi, Latchezar Popov & Raunaq S. Pungaliya, Bank Skin in the Game
and Loan Contract Design: Evidence from Covenant-Lite Loans, 51 J. FIN. QUANT. ANALYSIS 839 (2016).
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Over the past few decades, covenant- and loan structure and strategy
have evolved to address the perceived increased risks from excessive
leverage and cov-lite lending. Private ordering in loan contracts has emerged
o amelio a e eg la o conce n i h e pec o bo h he pe cei ed dearth
of covenant constraints and the potential excesses of add-backs.
Split control rights enable the application of traditional financial
maintenance covenants even to cov-lite loans, which ordinarily contain no
such covenants. The traditional covenants are contained in the revolving loan
agreement that typically accompanies leveraged and cov-lite term loans in a
multi-loan deal. So traditional covenants apply to the borrower, even though
not every loan in the deal package may reflect those same covenants. At the
same time, only the bank lenders on the revolving loan typically enjoy the
right to renegotiate or waive violations of the covenants in the deal. With split
control, cov-lite loans do not skirt or weaken covenant constraints. Instead,
split control facilitates renegotiation by concentrating control rights with a
smaller, more cohesive subset of lenders the bank lenders on the revolving
credit agreement to discipline the borrower.
Similarly, while add-backs may cause trepidation for regulators,
upward adjustments to EBITDA may do more than simply massage
bo o e le e age a io . New research by Badawi, Dyreng, de Fontenay
and Hills (BDDH) suggests that permissive use of add-backs may improve
the informativeness of signals to lende abo he bo o e condi ion.
Better information with respect to EBITDA may eliminate noisy features of
accounting earnings, such that add-backs may facilitate tighter covenants
while also reducing the incidence of false positive violations, thereby
avoiding costly renegotiation.150 Permissiveness with respect to add-backs
correlates with covenant tightness.
More generally, covenants appear to have become more efficient. Cash
flow covenants have largely replaced balance sheet covenants in private loan
agreements. Cash flow covenants are more discriminating. Financial
covenants have also become less restrictive in terms of both the number of
covenants in a given loan agreement and their strictness, leading to fewer
reported violations, as well as fewer false positives.151
A.

Split Control

Simply tracking the presence or absence of covenants in a particular
loan may not accurately characterize the covenant constraints at play. In a
world of leveraged lending with different types of lending institutions
pursuing different loan structures, a loan deal may incorporate multiple loans
with non-uniform features, such as varying maturity or covenant structure.152
150

Adam B. Badawi, Scott D. Dyreng, Elisabeth de Fontenay & Robert W. Hills, Contractual Complexity in
Debt Agreements: The Case of EBITDA, Working Paper (May 2021); available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3455497.
151
See infra Part III.C.
152
S&P GLOBAL, LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA (LCD): LEVERAGED LOAN PRIMER 6 (2020);
available at https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LCD%20Loan%20Primer.pdf.
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In an important recent study, Berlin, Nini & Yu (BNY) show that while
institutional leveraged loans and cov-lite loans have proliferated in recent
years, very few loan deals which involve contemporaneous or nearcontemporaneous origination of multiple loans to a single borrower are
issued without traditional maintenance covenants.153 Banks are partial to
revolving loans, which typically include financial maintenance covenants. In
many of the deals, the institutional term loans include identical covenants.
But whether they do or not, only the banks, and not the institutional lenders,
enjoy the right to renegotiate the covenants or waive violations.154 BNY call
this pli con ol, which allows a subset of lenders the revolver lenders,
typically to discipline the borrower firm. Other lenders in the deal
typically, the institutional lenders have no say in the renegotiation. This
split control is meant to concentrate control rights with a smaller group of
lenders. This pared-down set of bank lenders offers a tighter and more
cohesive workout group to negotiate with the borrower firm, thereby
reducing holdout and bargaining costs.155
Though the vast majority of outstanding leveraged loans appears to be
cov-lite, then, split control rights created at the deal level complexify the
situation somewhat. That very few leveraged loan contracts specify
maintenance covenants does not imply that covenant constraints are absent.
Regulators and rating agencies may therefore be too quick to characterize
cov-lite loans as simply profligate lending. Instead, they may be
overestimating the risks in the leveraged loan market.
BNY study loans from 2005-14.156 Completely cov-lite deals comprise
less than 2% of their sample. 157 Contrast this with the proportion of cov-lite
loans in the sample. In 2005, cov-lite term loans were close to zero; by 2014,
close to 40% were cov-lite. And as earlier noted, by 2018, cov-lite loans
comprised about 85% of the leveraged loan market by volume. 158 At the same
time, the frequency of deals with no maintenance covenant is only 1% and
has not increased in recent years.159 So almost all leveraged loan borrowers
are subject to financial covenants in at least one of their loans, typically the
revolving line of credit.
Consistent with the specialized monitoring that split control hopes to
accomplish, leveraged loan syndicates are structured to facilitate monitoring
in the presence of split control rights. Compared to deals without split control,
153

Berlin, Nini & Yu, supra note 127, at 250.
In no case were the revolving lenders excluded from control in he BNY ample. So pli con ol
essentially means that a term loan was excluded from the control features provided by covenants. Id. at 255.
Term loans also include a cross-default provision, such that a default in the revolver also triggers a default in
the term loan(s). Id. at 250.
155
Id. at 256.
156
BNY ample i limi ed o deal ha incl de bo h a e ol ing line of c edi and a e m loan. Id. at 250 &
fig. 1 note. For that sample, 65% of deals involve a revolver and term loan with identical financial covenants.
Email from Greg Nini (Jan. 29, 2021). An Online Appendix extends the sample period through the second
quarter of 2018, showing about a 20% increase in the frequency of split control rights from 2014. Berlin,
Nini & Yu, supra note 127, Online Appendix at 12-13 & fig. OA.1; available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3459733.
157
Berlin, Nini & Yu, supra note 127, at 250.
158
Martin-Buck, supra note 135, at 44.
159
Berlin, Nini & Yu, supra note 127, at 255.
154

30

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3882862

Do Lenders Still Monitor?
Leveraged Lending and the Search for Covenants
the revolving loan syndicate is more concentrated (has fewer lenders), the
mean lende commi men i la ge , and most importantly, he mean agen
commitment is larger, both by dollar amount and share of the total
commitment,160 similar to traditional syndicated lending.161 Moreover,
borrowers subject to split control rights violate covenants at the same rate as
other firms,162 which suggests that split control rights do work to enforce the
discipline of financial covenants.
Split control enables the covenants, monitoring, and renegotiation that
are customary in traditional syndicated lending. The agent bank leads the
syndicate, taking a significant stake in the loan to ensure other syndicate
members against moral hazard. As earlier described, covenants act as a
screening mechanism ex ante and as a trip wire ex post, causing the agent to
a e he bo o e
i a ion and ei he enego ia e he co enan o ai e
the violation. This applies even for loans held by CLOs.163 This monitoring
benefits not only the banks, but also bondholders and equity holders.164
Split control helps address bargaining frictions among leveraged
lenders induced by the large presence of institutional lenders. The
institutional tranches of a leveraged loan deal typically involve more lenders
and more diverse lenders than does a bank tranche. 165 Institutional lenders
also experience fewer repeat interactions with each other, so relationships
among them will be less likely. Finally, a lively secondary market in
institutional leveraged loans means that syndicate members will change over
the life of the loan. These various features imply that institutional loans are
more difficult to renegotiate.166 In BNY
ample, he incidence of pli
control rights is almost four times more likely among deals with an
institutional tranche.167 Split control rights have emerged to reduce
renegotiation costs, and are far more prevalent with institutional deals than
deals without an institutional tranche.168
160

Id. at 258-59 & tbl. 4.
See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
162
Id. at 250.
163
Id. at 251.
164
James, supra note 4, at 219; Nini, Smith & Sufi, supra note 5; Datta, Datta & Patel, supra note 4, at 437.
165
In BNY ample, he mean n mbe of lende in an in i ional e m loan (defined as a deal containing
an institutional tranche) is nine times greater than for other term loans (191 versus 20). Berlin, Nini & Yu,
supra note 127, at 261 & tbl. 6.
166
Cem Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, Bank Loans and Troubled Debt Restructurings, 118 J. FIN.
ECON. 192 (2015); Matthew G. Osborn, The Cost of Easy Credit: Loan Contracting with Non-Bank Investors,
Working Paper (Nov. 3, 2014), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2499798; ; Mehdi Beyhaghi, Ca
Nguyen & John K. Wald, Institutional Investors and Loan Dynamics: Evidence from Loan Renegotiations,
56 J. CORP. FIN. 482 (2019) (showing that nonbanks are more likely to exit a syndicate than participate in
renegotiation).
167
Berlin, Nini & Yu, supra note 127, at 251. BNY also rule out alternative explanations for the rise of split
control rights. Id.
168
Id. at 258-61 & fig. 3 & tbl. 5. BNY note that during the financial crisis, the average fee for a covenant
modification following a violation was 80% higher for institutional loans than for noninstitutional loans,
before the widespread use of split control rights. Id. at 262-23 & tbl. 7. In an Online Appendix, BNY extend
their sample though the second quarter of 2018, showing that the frequency of split control rights has
increased significantly. Online App. at 13-14 & fig. OA.1 & tbl. OA.4.
161

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3882862

31

Do Lenders Still Monitor?
Leveraged Lending and the Search for Covenants
The advent of split control rights should cause some rethinking of the
traditional assumptions surrounding leveraged and cov-lite loans.169 Once
individual loans are matched with the deals that spawned them, lender
governance seems again to be pervasive. Moreover, failing to account for
split control may lead to bias or erroneous conclusions. For example, analyses
attempting to explain cov-lite loan spreads or covenant tightness may miss
the mark if only loan-level but not deal-level covenant structure is
considered.
B.

Earnings Add-backs and Informativeness

In addition to growth in leveraged and cov-lite loans, earnings addbacks have caused concern with regulators.170 Add-backs may exacerbate the
end o a d highe le e age, gi en EBITDA ke ole in le e age mea e
for financial covenants.171 Private debt contracts often include bespoke
accounting provisions that allow for adjustments to financial performance
covenant earnings. According to one study, such adjustments to FASBGAAP-based net income and FASB-GAAP-based EBITDA increase income
by economically large amounts. Performance covenant earnings exceed
FASB-GAAP net income for more than 99% of loan contracts, and exceed
FASB-GAAP EBITDA for more than 84% of contracts. Magnitudes are also
large: for the median firm, FASB-GAAP net income is about 87% lower than
performance covenant earnings, and FASB-GAAP EBITDA is lower by
about 10%.172
At the same time, however, it appears that permissiveness with addbacks has compensating benefits. Permissiveness improves the
informativeness of EBITDA-based contract terms like financial covenants.
Contractual accounting rules for performance covenant earnings are
generally better at predicting future cash flows than are GAAP measures.173
Addi ional con ac al inno a ion eme ged o ed ce enego ia ion f ic ion a
ell. Amend and
E end p o i ion allo a bo o e o e end he ma i of an con en ing lende
lice of he ndica ed
loan, bjec o he e m of he bo o e e ension offer, including an increase in rate or fees and/or
modification of the amortization schedule. This feature enables the borrower and particular lenders to tailor
their loan slice to the particular circumstances they face, without having to get unanimous consent of lenders,
a o ld be c oma . A Refinance Facili enable a bo o e o c ea e an addi ional e m loan anche
based on an existing credit agreement, provided that the proceeds are used to refinance part of the existing
loan. This allows the borrower to refinance with a subset of lenders, typically to obtain a lower rate. Without
such flexibility, the borrower would be required to make any prepayments on a pro rata basis to all existing
lenders. Berlin, Nini & Yu, supra note 127, at 263 & Online App. 10-11.
169
Cf. Bratton, supra note 138, at 479 (noting that junior tranches of leveraged loans sold to institutional
lenders have longer maturities and higher yields and are publicly traded; concluding that public trading
einfo ce e i ance o co enan , and ha co -lite terms drive a convergence between the leveraged loan
and high yield bond markets).
170
BDDH ample i no clea l comp i ed onl of le e aged loan , b mean spread of their sample is 170
bps; BDDH, supra note 150, at 26-27 n.22; which suggests that many observations would be considered
leveraged loans.
171
Infla ed EBITDA in he n me a o of a financial a io o e a e he bo o e abili o co e pcoming
payment obligations, like fixed charges or interest payments. When inflated EBITDA is in the denominator,
the ratio understates borrower leverage.
172
Scott D. Dyreng, Rahul Vashishtha & Joseph Weber, Direct Evidence on the Informational Properties of
Earnings in Loan Contracts, 55 J. ACCOUNT RES. 371, 373 (2017).
173
Id. at 374.
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[N]onrecurring items are often excluded from adjusted EBITDA when
the firm has previously incurred nonrecurring items, but they are
included when they are informative of future performance. . . . [S]tudies
suggest that FASB GAAP does not sufficiently fulfill the informational
needs of debt contracting parties and the shortcomings are addressed
through contractual tailoring.174
Badawi, Dyreng, de Fontenay, and Hills (BDDH) create a
permissiveness index to track seven different categories of add-backs used in
private loan agreements to augment EBITDA. 175 Pe mi i ene
in hi
context refers not to the magnitudes of EBITDA adjustments, but to the
adjustment categories below:
Non-cash charges
Cash charges for extraordinary or non-recurring items
Cash charges for restructuring
Projected cash savings from synergies, restructurings, etc.
Fees and expense related to acquisitions, investments, equity or debt
issuances, etc.
Management/advisory fees payable to sponsor
Miscellaneous additional addbacks
Use of an adj men ca ego inc ea e a loan pe mi i ene co e b 1.
Summing up adjustment categories for a loan generates a score between 1
and 8 for that loan,176 with 1 being the least permissive (no add-back category
used) and 8 being the most permissive (all seven add-back categories used).
Mean permissiveness (standard deviation) from their sample is 3.61 (1.74).177
BDDH find that permissiveness increases with deal size, maturity, leverage,
and collateral, suggesting more permissive definitions of EBITDA with
larger and riskier loans.178 BDDH suggest that greater permissiveness begets
better informativeness to lenders by allowing the borrower to exclude noisy
information no eflec i e of he bo o e ea ning po en ial o abili o
honor future payment obligations. Add-backs for extraordinary or nonec ing i em , fo e ample, ma offe a clea e pic e of he bo o e
future earnings than leaving those extraordinary charges unaddressed. 179
174

Id. at 376. It also appears that conservative accounting for earnings, once thought to be useful for lenders
in mitigating downside risk, induces too many false positive violations, which fail to predict future distress
and instead trigger costly renegotiations and inefficient wealth transfers. Id. at 372.
175
BDDH, supra note 150.
176
Id. at 57, Appendix C.
177
Id. at 2.
178
Badawi, et al., supra note 150, at 19-21 & 45 tbl. 5.
179
The most common EBITDA adjustments remove transitory earnings items, affecting about one-fifth of
contracts. Ninzhong Li, Negotiated Measurement Rules in Debt Contracts, 48 J. ACCOUNT. RES. 1103
(2010); Peter R. Demerjian, Acco n ing S anda d and Deb Co enan : Ha he Balance Shee App oach
Led to a Decline in the Use of Balance Sheet Covenants?, 52 J. ACCOUNT. ECON. 178 (2011); Anne Beatty,
Lin Cheng & Tzachi Zach, Nonrecurring Items in Debt Contracts, 36 CONTEMP. ACCOUNT. RES. 139 (2019).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3882862

33

Do Lenders Still Monitor?
Leveraged Lending and the Search for Covenants
Also, rather than assuming standardized financial covenants, BDDH use a
mix of machine learning techniques and hand collection to create a dataset
that captures actual covenant thresholds and realized covenant violations.
They show that relying on standardized covenant measures risks
overestimating realized violations, and that the likelihood of overestimating
a violation increases with the level of permissiveness.180
BDDH show a number of interesting results. Contractual EBITDA is
more permissive with accrual volatility, consistent with findings that accruals
may not otherwise usefully translate into informativeness for lenders with
e pec o bo o e financial condi ion. 181 Conversely, cash flow volatility
is negatively associated with permissiveness, suggesting that cash flow
ola ili eflec
ef l info ma ion abo he bo o e abili o hono i
payment obligations.
Permissiveness is also increasing in the ex ante costs of renegotiation.
Covenant violations may be costly to the parties, so they have incentive to
con ac in a a ha igge a iola ion onl
hen he bo o e
performance signals actual deterioration. Especially when renegotiation costs
are high, as with institutional leveraged loan tranches, reducing the incidence
of false positive violations is key. 182
Consistent with the improved informativeness that high permissiveness
brings, the market response to a covenant violation with high permissiveness
is more severe than with low permissiveness, since the violation is less likely
o be a fal e po i i e and mo e likel o eflec he bo o e
e distress.
The equity market reaction to a covenant violation is therefore more negative
when permissiveness is high.183 Moreover, permissiveness is negatively
related to both covenant slack and covenant violations. That is, covenants are
tighter and false positive violations are fewer. 184 This suggests that
pe mi i ene imp o e he ignal o lende conce ning he bo o e
e
condition by removing less informative features of accounting earnings from
the EBITDA definition contracted for in the loan agreement. Finally, credit
spreads also increase with permissiveness, suggesting that lenders may
charge for the risk of false negatives.185
180

BDDH, supra note 150, at 28-30 & 50 tbl. 9.
Patricia M. Dechow & Ilia D. Dichev, The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual
Estimation Errors, 77 ACCT G REV. 35 (2002).
182
BDDH, supra note 150, at 27-28 & 38 fig. 2.
183
Id. at 23-25 & 48 tbl. 7.
184
Id. at 4.
185
Id. at 25-27 & 49 tbl. 8. One potential caveat is that indices are often tricky to interpret. Capturing the
specific mechanisms that drive empirical results based on indices is sometimes a fraught endeavor. With the
BDDH permissiveness index, for example, equal weighting may be a convenient default position, but it offers
a somewhat blunt metric to capture the interesting results they find. Magnitudes of add-backs within specific
categories, or other prospective mechanisms, for instance, may help capture additional nuance.
Almost two decades into the debates over dueling corporate governance indices, for example, scholarly
consensus on what matters for corporate governance remains elusive. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM)
proposed the first widely debated governance index the G-index which relies on twenty-four equally
weighted governance features, attempting to measure governance quality and the degree of managerial
entrenchment. GIM found a significant inverse correlation between management entrenchment and firm
value and pe fo mance, ing Tobin Q, ock e n , and ope a ing pe fo mance a hei dependen
variables. Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118
181
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C.

The Turn Toward Efficient Covenants

At first blush, weaker covenants may seem like a bad idea. They may
encourage moral hazard, leaving borrowers too free to take ill-advised risks
and bl n ing lende abili o incen i e o moni o . Strict covenants, on the
other hand, offer responsive tripwires to alert the lender when the borrower
performance deteriorates or it strays toward a risky path. Regular feedback in
this regard may enable both lender and borrower to gain new information
about each other and set expectations about the future of he bo o e
business. This information acquisition and expectation setting will be
especially useful for new lending relationships.186
At the same time, however, strict covenants come with costs. They
con ain he bo o e la i de o n i b ine ex ante,187 and they
require more regular lender intervention ex post, since violations become
more frequent.188 Granted, waiver is the most common response, but even
ha e i e ac ion on he lende
pa . Generally, the lender must
investigate, decide on the severity of the violation, negotiate with the
borrower, and then document the resolution. Over the life of a loan, the task
of managing violations of varying severity may not be worth the candle.
Ultimately, the lender simply seeks to guard against the prospect of the
bo o e pa men defa l . Parties to loan agreements may pursue optimal
covenants to minimize these costs.
Over the last few decades, covenants have evolved. Balance sheet
covenants have become more scarce relative to cash flow covenants in private

Q.J. ECON. 107, 144 (2003) (finding a relationship between an index of corporate governance measures and
stock performance during the 1990s). Bebch k, Cohen, and Fe ell (BCF) c i ici ed GIM finding ,
a e ing in ead ha onl i of GIM
en -four governance features mattered. Those six features make
p BCF E-index; for them, the other features are just noise. Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, & Allen Ferrell,
What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 738 (2008). Other governance indices and
criticism of the G-index and the E-index followed. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus,
Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns?: An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and
Investor Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655, 685 (2006) (challenging GIM finding on ock e n ); Sanjai
Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 257 (2008) (finding
no correlation between governance measures and stock returns for either the G-index or E-index); Miroslava
Straska & H. Gregory Waller, Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature,
49 J. FIN. QUANT. ANALYS. 933 (2014) (arguing that the eighteen measures BCF would drop from the Gindex predict takeover likelihood); Jonathan M. Karpoff, Robert J. Schonlau & Eric W. Wehrly, Do Takeover
Defense Indices Measure Takeover Deterrence?, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2359 (2017) (proposing an index using
instrumented versions of the G-index and E-index that predict takeover likelihood).
186
Nicolae Garleanu & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants, 22 REV. FIN. STUD.
749 (2009). The new lender may later relax covenants as the borrowing relationship generates new
information about the borrower. Id.; Wouter Dessein, Information and Control in Ventures and Alliances, 60
J. FIN. 2513 (2005).
187
Smith & Warner, supra note 1, at 123-24.
188
Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, Debt Covenants and Renegotiation, 2 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 95
(1992); Garleanu & Zwiebel, supra note 186; Valeri V. Nikolaev, Scope for Renegotiation in Private Debt
Contracts, 65 J. ACCOUNT. & ECON. 270, 274 (noting the tradeoff with renegotiation, which enables
monitoring of the borrower, but also allows the lender to interfere with management decisions and hold up
he fi m in e men ).
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debt contracts.189 Peter Demerjian hypothesizes that changes in accounting
standard setting have contributed to making the balance sheet less useful for
loan contracting.190 Standard setting shifted focus from the determination of
net income to the valuation of assets and liabilities (the balance sheet
approach), and new accounting standards emerged. With this balance sheet
approach came balance sheet adjustments, which embrace estimates of asset
and liability values, as well as discretion in the timing of recognition of
changes in value, among other things. These adjustments may limit the utility
of balance sheets for debt contracting parties, who rely on conservative
balance sheets and high verifiability in determining the lower bound of a
fi m liquidation value. Not all adjustments can be verifiably measured. 191
Error or bias may result.192
The turn away from balance sheet covenants has been auspicious. Cash
flow covenants turn out to be more efficient than balance sheet covenants.
Cash flow covenants trigger false positives where the borrower violates but
only a low likelihood of distress exists far less often than balance sheet
covenants. Griffin, Nini, and Smith (GNS) confirm the trend toward cash
flow covenants and away from balance sheet covenants that Demerjian
identifies, as well as showing the relative efficiency of cash flow
covenants.193 O e GNS
en -year sample period, the use of balance
sheet covenants has given way to cash flow covenants, as Figure 2 shows.
By 2016, cash flow covenants predominated.

189

Demerjian, supra note 179. In 1996, more than 80% of deals included balance sheet covenants. By 2007,
balance sheet covenant usage had dropped to 32%. Cash flow covenants showed no similar declining trend.
Id.
190
Demerjian is careful not to overclaim. There may be other factors that also affect the observed changes in
covenant use. Id. at 196.
191
For example, new standards include wider use of fair value accounting. But one form of fair value
accounting allows for unobservable inputs into the valuation. Id. at 182.
192
In addition, researchers have offered evidence that managers use discretion opportunistically across a
number of accounting contexts. Jennifer Francis, J. Douglas Hanna & Linda Vincent, Causes and Effects of
Discretionary Asset Write-Offs, 34 J. ACCOUNT. RES. 117 (1996); Edward J. Riedl, An Examination of LongLived Asset Impairments, 79 ACCOUNT. REV. 823 (2004); Anne Beatty & Joseph Weber, Accounting
Discretion in Fair Value Estimates: An Examination of SFAS 142 Goodwill Impairments, 44 J. ACCOUNT
RES. 257 (2006); Karthik Ramanna & Ross L. Watts, Evidence on the Use of Unverifiable Estimates in
Required Goodwill Impairment, 17 REV. ACCOUNT. STUD. 749 (2012); Patricia M. Dechow, Linda A. Myers
& Catherine Shakespeare, Fair Value Accounting and Gains from Asset Securitizations: A Convenient
Earnings Management Tool with Compensation Side-Benefits, 49 J. ACCOUNT. & ECON. 2 (2010).
193
Thomas P. Griffin, Greg Nini & David C. Smith, Losing Control?: The 20-Year Decline in Loan Covenant
Restrictions 3, Working Paper (Dec. 2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277570.
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FIGURE 2: BALANCE SHEET AND CASH FLOW FINANCIAL COVENANTS194

The figure plots the annual mean fraction of loans that contain a financial covenant based on
a balance sheet item (red) and based on a cash flow item (blue). We classify covenants as
cash flow if they are written on EBITDA and balance sheet otherwise. The groups are not
mutually exclusive because loan packages often contain more than one covenant.

Financial covenants have also become less restrictive, as captured in
Figure 3. The number of financial covenants for a given loan has decreased
roughly by half in the two decades from 1997 to 2017. The remaining
covenants are more than twice as slack as covenants two decades prior in
terms of distance to the covenant threshold at origination. Even revolver-only
leveraged loan packages show less restrictive covenants.195 Reported
violations are correspondingly fewer: the annual proportion of public firms
reporting a loan covenant violation dropped by nearly 70%.196

194

Griffin, Nini & Smith, supra note 193, at 42 fig. 4.
Id.at 30.
196
Id. at 1 & 40 fig. 2.
195
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FIGURE 3: FINANCIAL COVENANTS IN CORPORATE LOAN AGREEMENTS197

The figure plots the annual mean number of covenants (blue line, measured on left axis) and
the annual mean number of standard deviations to violation for the tightest covenant (red
line, measured on right axis) at contract origination. The sample is a large set of loans in
Dealscan issued to U.S. nonfinancial firms in Compustat.

This shift to less restrictive covenants is driven by removal of the less
informative balance sheet covenants, relying instead on the more efficient
cash flow covenants. GNS show a secular decline in false positives, without
a large increase in false negatives. 198 So although the overall use of covenants
has declined, covenants seem to be more discriminating in differentiating
distress from non-distress situations. Violations that result only in a waiver
( efe ed o a foo fa l ) are also far more prevalent in the early part of
the sample period. In 1997, foot faults account for almost two-thirds of new
covenant violations. By 2016, foot faults are closer to one-third of new
violations. Overall, balance sheet covenants were also 40% more likely to
result in foot faults than cash flow covenants. 199
The trends toward lower ex ante covenant strictness and fewer ex post
iola ion eem o be d i en b lende e ol ion o co enan
c e ih
highe ignal-to-noi e a ios. The optimal covenant threshold will be tighter
as the probability of distress increases, and looser in the relative costs of false

197

Griffin, Nini & Smith, supra note 193, at 39 fig. 1.
A false negative in this context arises when a borrower becomes distressed without having triggered a
covenant violation.
199
Id. at 4.
198
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positives to false negatives.200 In this way, financial covenants can better
differentiate healthy from distressed borrowers.
These trends do not appear to be driven by changes in renegotiation
costs related to changes in the number or type of corporate lenders (i.e., bank
versus non-bank institutional lenders) or the growth of cov-lite loans. GNS
uncover no evidence that the presence of leveraged loans, loans marketed to
institutional investors, private equity deals, improved credit quality, or
increased credit supply explain the results.201
IV.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have explained the rise of the leverage loan market
and eg la o
conce n abo e ce i e i k in ha ma ke . Eigh -five
percent of leveraged loans are covenant-lite: they contain no financial
maintenance covenants. Reported covenant violations have dropped. This
seeming dearth of guardrails in a risky market implicates both systemic risk
and corporate governance concerns. The new lender governance described
above, however, offers interesting new avenues for addressing both systemic
risk concerns and governance. Lenders seem to have innovated in three
important ways to curb risk and facilitate renegotiation by resort to private
ordering in loan agreements.
With split control rights, the informativeness of EBITDA add-backs,
and the general turn to efficient covenants, it appears that borrowers and
lenders have created innovative covenant structures to address their own
private interests, as well as eg la o fea of unsound lending practices. In
deals that include split control rights, bank lenders and only the bank
lenders enjoy discretion to apply, renegotiate, or waive traditional financial
maintenance covenant constraints with respect to all loans that are part of the
deal. Placing this discretion with the bank lenders reduces holdout problems
and facilitates renegotiation. The advent of split control strongly suggests that
traditional financial covenants will continue to matter in the leveraged loan
market. Leveraged and cov-lite loans will not be bereft of financial covenant
constraints. Instead, traditional covenants from bank revolving credit
agreements will cabin risk taking. Covenant coverage will not disappear. In
this respect, the new governance closely replicates the function of the old
governance. Given the new learning on split control rights, merely tallying
the number of cov-lite loans and the volume of cov-lite loan dollars would
seem to tell regulators and rating agencies little about systemic risk. Instead,
analysts need to discern covenant structures from the deal perspective in
order to appreciate borrower fi m o e all co enan con ain .
That said, the loans at issue are still below-investment grade, many
sporting under-reported leverage ratios based on deal-related add-backs.202
200

Id. at 2.
Id. at 4-5, 31. More generally, the secular trend that GNS identify does not focus solely on the leveraged
loan market.
202
See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
201
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So while the fear of flying may be assuaged somewhat, it will likely not soon
dissipate. At the same time, add-backs do not necessarily represent
unmitigated profligacy. Though the leveraged loan market offers real risks of
excessive leverage, more permissiveness with add-backs appears to improve
informativeness, generating better predictions of future cash flows related to
financial covenants. Bespoke contractual accounting rules for financial
covenant earnings predict future cash flows more reliably than GAAP
measures. One result is tighter covenants with fewer false positive violations.
More generally, with the secular trend toward looser and more efficient
covenants, based on cash flow covenants instead of balance sheet covenants,
covenants have become more efficient. Covenants with higher signal to noise
benefit lenders and borrowers alike, hitting a tripwire only when the firm is
near distress, and reducing costs overall.
Together these evolving trends suggest that private innovations in
lending arrangements may reduce risk in leveraged lending markets, facilitate
lower-cost renegotiation, and improve lender governance. Reg la o
worries about excessive risk in the leveraged loan market may be overblown
insofar as they overlook the sophisticated loan structures emerging to address
lender governance concerns and to avoid renegotiation frictions.
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